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The Populist Safeguards of Federalism
ROBERT A. MIKOS*
Extant legal scholarship often portrays citizens as the catalysts of
federalization.Scholars say that citizens pressure Congress to impose their
morals on people living in other states, to trump home-state laws with
which they disagree, or to shift the costs of regulatory programs onto outof-state taxpayers, all to the demise of states' rights. Since Congress
(usually) gives citizens what they want, scholars insist the courts must step
in to protect states from federal encroachments. By contrast, this Article
proposes a new theory of the populist safeguards offederalism. It develops
two distinct but mutually reinforcing reasons why populist demands on
Congress do not portend the demise of states' rights. One reason is that the
demandfor federalization (assuming it even exists) may be ineffectual. Due
to the heterogeneity of citizens' policy preferences and the antimajoritarian structure of federal lawmaking, proponents of national
legislation may be unable to garnerthe votes needed to pass congressional
legislation that trumps state prerogatives. The second more fundamental
reason is that citizens may be inclined to limitfederal authority ratherthan
to expand it. The theory identifies several reasons, overlooked in the
scholarly literature, why citizens may oppose congressional efforts to
expand federal authority vis-A-vis the states, even when Congress could
enact a policy that most citizens would prefer on the merits. First, citizens
may fear that congressional action on one issue (however desirable) may
pave the way for unwelcome federal action on related issues in the future.
Second, citizens may prefer to have state, rather than federal, officials
administerpolicies, not only because they trust state officials more, but also
because they can keep state officials on a shorter leash. Third, citizens may
value politicalprocesses, and not just the outputs of those processes; they
may be willing to sacrifice desiredpolicy outcomes at the federal level out
of respect for direct democracy and federalism. The Article closes by
discussing some implications of the theory for ongoing debates over the
judicialreview offederalism.

* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School; Acting
Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, Law School. A.B., Princeton
University; J.D., University of Michigan. I am grateful to A.J. Bellia, Omri Ben-Shahar,
Alan Brownstein, Chris Elmendorf, Rick Garnett, Tom Joo, Cindy Kam, Carlton Larson,
John Nagle, J.J. Prescott, and Workshop participants at the University of Michigan, Notre
Dame University, and the University of Virginia, for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of the Article. I also want to thank Botum Chhay, Mark Day, Kira King, and Erin
Wallace for their diligent research assistance. Comments are appreciated
(ramikos@ucdavis.edu).
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I. INTRODUCTION
For several decades following the New Deal, the Supreme Court
declined to set any meaningful legal limits on federal power vis-ii-vis the
states, seemingly content to let the national political process determine the
reach of congressional authority.1 The theory was that the states, by virtue of
their influence over Congress (among other things), could protect themselves
from unwelcome federal encroachments, thereby making judicial oversight
of federal power largely unnecessary. 2 Indeed, by 1985, a slim majority on
1 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915, 938-39 (2005) (discussing the influence of political safeguards
theory on the Court's reluctance to police federal powers).
2 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
551-52 (1954) (suggesting that state governments can fight off federal encroachments
due to their control of congressional redistricting, among other things). See also Bradford
R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321
(2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to
Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice
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the Court openly endorsed the so-called political safeguards of federalism,
acknowledging that "State sovereign interests... are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
'3
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power."
Once William Rehnquist was appointed as Chief Justice, however, the
Court dramatically altered course. It restored judicially devised constraints
on congressional power as it invalidated (or interpreted narrowly) a wide
range of federal statutes in the name of states' rights. 4 In reprising the role as
supreme arbiter of state/federal powers, members of the Court expressed
serious misgivings about leaving state power to the mercy of Congress. In
United States v. Lopez, for example, Justice Kennedy wrote that the "absence
of structural mechanisms to require [federal] officials to undertake this
principled task [of respecting state prerogatives], and the momentary political
convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a
complete renunciation of the judicial role." 5 Many legal scholars applauded
the Court's renewed efforts to rein in congressional power, critiquing the
political safeguards argument on both pragmatic and jurisprudential
6
grounds.
Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for
the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REv. 329
(2003).
3 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding that the
civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act exceeds Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1997)
(holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeds Congress's power to
enforce substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1995) (holding that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
impermissibly commandeers state law enforcement officers to conduct background
checks on prospective gun purchasers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68
(1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress's commerce
power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1995 unconstitutionally
commandeers state legislatures to provide sites for disposal of waste).
5 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 951 (2001); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A.
Young, Federalismand the Double StandardofJudicialReview, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001);
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A
Theory of JudicialEnforcement ofFederalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447 (1995); Marci A.
Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46
VILL. L. REv. 1069 (2001); John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States'
Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 90
(2004); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
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The doubts about Congress's willingness to respect state authority stem
largely from conventional assumptions regarding what ordinary citizens want
from government and the demands they make upon Congress in particular.
Critics claim that, if given the opportunity, the people would gladly transfer
most (if not all) state power to the federal government, thereby undermining
the Framers' design. 7 This widely shared view presumes that. ordinary
citizens do not care about government structure, but instead only care about
8
its outputs, namely, the policies the government (state or federal) adopts. It
is this single-minded focus on policy outcomes that supposedly threatens
state prerogatives; after all, there are powerful motives for citizens to turn to
Congress, rather than their state governments, to provide the policy outcomes
they desire, even when the normative case for federal action is weak. 9 In
particular, citizens are tempted to wield congressional power to impose their
values on citizens living in other states, to trump home-state laws with which
they disagree, to shift the costs of regulatory programs onto out-of-state
taxpayers, and to exploit the economies of scale from passing national
laws. 10 Since members of Congress are beholden to their constituents,
Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1459 (2001); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT.
REv. 341.
7 Historically, some scholars argued that the threat to state power came from the
federal government itself Congress would usurp state powers at the behest of its own,
members who desire to maximize their power "by occupying ever larger swaths of
policymaking space." Levinson, supra note 1, at 917 (discussing the consensus view
among scholars that the "national government will seek to expand the policy space it
controls at the expense of the states" due to the empire-building ambitions of federal
officials). The views of the people-their constituents-were of little consequence. More
recently, however, commentators have dismissed empire-building as the raison d'etre of
elected federal officials, and instead consider re-election to be the paramount goal of
politicians (either as an end in itself, or as a necessary means to some other end). In order
to maximize their chances of being re-elected, politicians push for policies that accord
with the demands of their constituents-the people. In short, members of Congress do not
usurp state powers to build an empire, but because their constituents demand they take
action without regard to state power. Id.at 972.
8 See, e.g., id.at 943 (suggesting that citizens "are concerned about the content
of.. . law, not whether that law comes from the federal government or from the states");
John 0. McGinnis, PresidentialReview as ConstitutionalRestoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901,
931-32 (2001) (opining that "because [federalism] is a structural principle, citizens are
largely indifferent to it when it conflicts with issues that stir their passions").
9 The dominant concern today is that the federal government will assume too much
power, not too little, and assert control over issues that, at least arguably, do not call for
centralized policies. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICH. L. REv. 813, 816 (1998).
10
See infra Part III.
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Congress would readily give citizens what they want-an ever expanding
bonanza of federal legislation-eventually causing the federal system to
collapse."I Indeed, even supporters of the political safeguards approach seem
to concede that citizens may demand too much federal legislation; they thus
say we must instead rely on political institutions, such as the political party
system, to protect state prerogatives.12
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this Article suggests that populist
control of Congress does not forebode the demise of states' rights for two
distinct but mutually reinforcing reasons. First, on many issues populist
demand for federalization (if it exists at all) may be ineffectual because
proponents of national legislation will be unable to garner enough votes in
Congress to preempt state authority. Due to the fragmentation of national
public opinion, Congress will be unable to supply a policy that the national
majority would deem preferable to (or at least as good as) the state policies it
would displace. Structural features of the national lawmaking process further
hinder Congress's ability to give citizens the policy that they want. The
states, by contrast, are smaller, more cohesive polities, utilizing lawmaking
procedures (such as the ballot initiative) that make it easier for states to
provide populist legislation that more closely matches the preferences of
their people. The supposed allure of federalization-the broad jurisdictional
reach of federal law, for example-is simply lost on those citizens who deem
congressional policy inferior to state policy. In other words, even assuming
that citizens would, in the abstract, want Congress to usurp state powers (for
the reasons discussed above), they will rarely succeed in passing
congressional legislation that usurps state power. By virtue of congressional
inaction, state power will remain intact.
Second, on many issues, ordinary citizens may be more inclined to limit
federal authority than to expand it, even when Congress could enact a policy
that most citizens would prefer. The Article identifies several reasons, largely
overlooked in the scholarly literature, why citizens may oppose efforts to
expand federal power vis-6-vis states. First, some citizens may fear that
congressional action on one issue may lay the groundwork for federalizing
related issues-issues on which they would prefer state control. Second,
citizens may worry about how laws will be enforced by Executive branch
officials in the federal government. Congressional statutes are often vague,
leaving it to the Executive to resolve key policy disputes. Since they trust
state governments more than they trust the federal government, and since
they generally exert more control over state executive officials (via direct
11 See infra Part II (discussing citizen influence over Congress).
12 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 278-87 (arguing that because political party
machinery is crucial for re-election-and because local officials control the party
machinery-members of Congress will respect local authority).
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election and recalls), citizens may prefer to have state officials administer the
laws (and have state courts interpret them), and hence, may oppose
congressional legislation that vests enforcement authority in federal officials.
Third, citizens also care about government processes, and not just the
outcomes of those processes. Some citizens value the opportunity to
participate directly in lawmaking that is only available at the state level (via
ballot initiatives, etc.) and thus may resist efforts to federalize policy
domains that crowd out such opportunities. Moreover, some citizens value
federalism itself; that is, they have opinions about which level of government
ought to control various policy domains, and these federalism beliefs may
temper their support for congressional proposals which, though appealing on
the merits, intrude into domains they believe in principle should be
controlled by the states instead.
The main contribution of this Article is in developing the theory of what
I call the populist safeguards of federalism and in reviewing the previously
neglected political science and legal research that supports that theory. I do
not claim that the populist safeguards do a perfect job of protecting states'
rights (in fact, even suggesting what might constitute the perfect balance of
power would be fraught with controversy). I merely suggest that the political
process is not so prone to aggrandize federal power as the Court and many
scholars now claim.
The Article also offers some modest insights regarding judicial review
and federalism. The Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence has been
subjected to widespread criticisms, 13 and even many ardent supporters of the
Court's recent effort to cabin congressional power have acknowledged that
the Court has not performed its job particularly well.14 Given the criticisms
of judicial review and the diminished need for court protection of states'
rights, my theory suggests that judicial review of federalism could be more
circumscribed than it is now, focusing, for example, on the situations in
which the populist safeguards of federalism are most likely to fail (such as
when administrative agencies expand federal powers vis-6-vis the states).
Indeed, several sitting Justices have criticized the Court's recent federalism
13 Some scholars claim, for example, that the Framers did not intend for the Court to
have the final say regarding Congress's powers; rather, they wanted the people (through
their elected representatives in Congress) to decide for themselves, and free of judicial
meddling, on the proper scope of congressional authority. E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES:

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEw 47-49

(2005). Although this Article has nothing to add to the historical debate, it does suggest
why citizens may be up to this formidable task.
14 E.g., Baker & Young, supra note 6, at 88 (acknowledging that the Court's recent
decisions "[do] not speak well for the judicial ability to develop doctrinal limits on
national power that are at once meaningful and workable" but still defending judicial
review of federalism).
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jurisprudence and remain committed (at least on the surface) to relying on
the political process to safeguard state interests. Justice Stephen Breyer, for
example, writing in his dissent in United States v. Morrison, a case in which
the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act on
federalism grounds, suggested that "Congress, not the courts, must remain
15
primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance."'
The theory developed herein lends support to calls for relaxing judicial
oversight of federal/state power disputes, while at the same time explaining
why judicial review of individual rights claims remains necessary-namely,
to protect minority rights from majority-friendly state lawmaking processes.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the theoretical and
empirical justification for focusing on ordinary citizens-the notion that
citizens hold Congress's reins, and Congress will pass legislation only when
they demand it. Part III then explains why, according to the conventional
wisdom, Congress's responsiveness to popular demands jeopardizes states'
rights, namely, why citizens (supposedly) are so keen to expand federal
power vis--vis the states. Parts IV and V contain the core contributions of
the Article. Part IV explains how fragmented public opinion and the antimajoritarian structure of federal lawmaking effectively frustrate citizen
demands for federalization. Part V then explores the reasons why citizens
may actually oppose federalization and protect state power from
congressional action, even when Congress could enact a policy that the
national majority supports on the merits. Part VI then discusses some
implications of the theory for judicial review.
II. CONGRESS'S DEMOCRATIC MASTERS

My theory rests on the assumption that ordinary citizens (the people,
colloquially) influence what Congress does. 16 In particular, I assume that
15 529 U.S. 598, 660 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id.at 647 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing the "Founders' considered judgment that politics, not judicial review,
should mediate between state and national interests"); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Framers
did not ...select the Judicial Branch as the constitutional guardian of. . . state interests.
Rather, the Framers designed important structural safeguards to ensure that when the
National Government enacted substantive law. . . the normal operation of the legislative
process itself would adequately defend state interests from undue infringement.");
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 184 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
political safeguards of federalism are working... a plain-statement rule [requiring
Congress's clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity] is an adequate check on
congressional overreaching, and.., today's abandonment of that approach is wholly
unwarranted.").
16 Ordinary citizens are to be distinguished from political elites, including elected
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Congress will pass legislation only when the people-or more precisely,
when enough people, across enough states and congressional districtsdemand it; otherwise, Congress will abstain. While there are competing
theories of representation, 17 this Part argues that there is a sound theoretical
and empirical basis for suggesting the people hold Congress's reins. In any
event, most critiques of the political safeguards seem to be based on the very
same premise (after all, popular demands for congressional action threaten
states' rights only if Congress responds to such demands), so if my
assumption were seriously flawed, the very problem my theory is meant to
address (citizens demanding too much federalization) would disappear as
well.
Citizens control Congress in several ways, the most important (and most
direct) of which is through elections. 18 Members of Congress want to get reelected; indeed, they often fixate on it and prioritize it above all other goals
(particularly since it may be necessary to achieve other goals). 19 But to get

officials, the rich, the powerful, special interest groups, and so on. In theory at least, all
citizens wield influence over Congress; in reality, of course, those who do not vote-or
who do not participate in the political process in other ways-wield comparatively less
influence. But for ease of exposition, and since there is no a priorireason to suspect that
citizens who participate have significantly different preferences regarding the balance of
state/federal power than those who do not participate, I will simplify the picture
somewhat by discussing all citizens, not just those who participate.
17 See

WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE,

JR.,

ET

AL.,

LEGISLATION

AND STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION, 69-116 (2d ed. 2006), for a discussion of competing theories of
representation and legislative behavior.
18 John Kingdon, in his seminal study of roll call voting in Congress, identifies
several mechanisms by which constituents wield influence in the Capitol:
The recruitment process, which brings a congressman with certain attitudes to the
House and keeps him there, first of all, determines the major directions which his
voting decisions take. Congressmen's apparent preoccupation with graceful ways of
explaining potentially unpopular votes, furthermore, often results in votes cast in
accordance with constituents' wishes.... Potential campaign or electoral
consequences and the many uncertainties of primary and general election politics,
finally, prompt congressmen to keep their constituents in mind as they vote. It is
thus likely that constituency imposes some meaningful constraints on congressmen's
voting behavior.
JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 67-68 (3d ed. 1989). Though
elections may not convey precise information about what constituents want on any one
issue, elected representatives can discern constituent preferences on issues from a variety
of other sources, including constituent mailings, public opinion polls, meetings with
citizens, consultations with fellow representatives, and so on. Id. at 55.
19

See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS

(1978); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(2d ed. 1989); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
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re-elected, representatives need the support of their constituents (and more
specifically, the voters). Hence, they will usually do what constituents ask
them to do. 20 If they do not-if they vote against constituent preferencesthey must find some satisfactory way to explain themselves (which may be
impossible, or take more effort than it is worth), or else risk losing the next
2
election. 1
Given the electoral pressure on members of Congress, it should come as
no surprise that when Congress acts, the votes of members tend to reflect
what the people (or more precisely, their own constituents) want. A large
body of empirical research has established a close link between public
opinion and voting behavior among members of Congress. 22 Some studies
have found that constituents are an even more powerful influence on
congressional behavior than the political parties, the President, special
interest groups, and legislative staffs. 23 This may help to explain why
members of Congress go to such great lengths to explain their votes to
constituents-and frame their campaign messages in ways they think will

20

ROBERT S. ERIKSON & KENT L. TEDIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 288 (6th ed.
2001) ("Because of the fear of electoral sanctions (or simply because they believe it to be
what they ought to do), elected leaders play the role of 'delegate,' trying to please their
constituents."); see also KINGDON, supra note 18, at 22-23; Levinson, supra note 1, at
929 (noting that "elected representatives are keenly interested in winning and keeping
their offices .... [and this] requires [them] to ingratiate themselves to their constituents").
21 See KINGDON, supra note 18, at 47-48 (noting how members of Congress are
"constantly called upon to explain to constituents why they voted as they did").
22

JOHN

G. GEER,

FROM TEA LEAVES TO OPINION POLLS: A THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC

LEADERSHIP 89 (1996); Larry M. Bartels, Constituency Opinion and Congressional
Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 457, 467 (1991)
(finding a strong statistical relationship between congressional roll call votes on Pentagon
spending and constituent preferences for defense spending, concluding that "public
opinion was a powerful force for policy change"); Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes,
Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POL. SC. REV. 45, 56 (1963) (finding that
roll call voting in the House is "strongly influenced" by both constituent preferences and
the personal beliefs of the Representative); Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro,
Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 175, 189 (1983) (finding a
high level of congruence between occasions of public opinion change and the direction of
ensuing policy change over five decades). See also ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C.
WRIGHT & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN

THE AMERICAN STATES 244 (1993) (concluding that "public opinion is the dominant
influence on policy making in the American states").
23 E.g., KINGDON, supra note 18, at 22-23. In Kingdon's study, only other members
of Congress had as much influence as constituents. Id. at 22. But one of the reasons
members defer so much to colleagues is because colleagues know so much about what
the voters want (e.g., because they hail from a like-minded district). See id. at 90.
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resonate with ordinary voters, 24 for they would not need to explain
themselves if they believed they could ignore public opinion altogether.
In spite of this body of research, some scholars discount the general
public's sway in Congress because, they say, the people do not pay
sufficiently close attention to national politics. 25 But citizens may wield

influence even when they do not pay close attention to what Congress is
doing.26 Members of Congress realize that even if a controversial vote
escapes notice today it could still be exploited by an opponent in the next
primary or general election. 27 That is why they feel obliged to do what their
constituents want (or would want, if they were watching more closely).
Hence, citizens do not necessarily need to monitor Congress constantly to
keep that institution in check. In fact, when voters show a lack of interest in
Congress, it may be a sign that Congress is actually doing what they want;
after all, they have little incentive to observe Congress closely if it does its
job well. John Kingdon explains:
24

See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER:

POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE Loss OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENEsS 8

(2000)

(demonstrating that political elites attempt to frame arguments in ways that resonate with
the public).
25 It is worth noting that the public is not as ill-informed as skeptics sometimes
claim, and may not need as much information to make good decisions as critics often
assume. On the most salient issues of the day, citizens are, in fact, well-informed. (As
elections draw near, they also become better informed about more issues.) What is more,
they do not necessarily need an encyclopedic knowledge of government affairs in order
to formulate rational opinions about Congress, its members, and their outputs. When
voters do lack information, they can use a variety of shortcuts (such as organizational
endorsements, candidate traits, discussions with friends and co-workers, and other
heuristics) to make reasoned choices about candidates and issues. See V.0. KEY, JR., THE
RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE 7 (1966) (concluding that "voters are not fools"); ARTHUR
LUPiA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 2-6 (1998)
(demonstrating that voters are able to make reasoned choices, even without full
information); SAMUEL POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER 20 ("It is certainly true that most
citizens do not know many of the basic facts about their government, but assessing voters
by civics exams misses the many things that voters do know, and the many ways in
which they can do without the facts that the civics tradition assumes they should know.").
26 KINGDON, supra note 18, at 67 ("While [constituency] has a greater impact on
high-salience votes, there is still substantial evidence of distinct influence even on lowsalience votes in which constituents' interest is probably virtually nil."); Miller & Stokes,
supra note 22, at 56 (finding constituent preferences influence roll call voting even when
voters are not well informed).
27 KINGDON, supra note 18, at 60 ("If nobody in the district notices a vote at the time
it occurs, an opponent in the next election still might pick up an unpopular vote and use it
against the congressman."); Miller & Stokes, supra note 22, at 54-55 (reasoning that
since "their records are quite visible to their constituents," members often play it safe,
trying not to give opponents any "material they can use" in the next election).
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If constituents were better informed, it would probably be a mark of arousal
over something that the congressman did which was out of keeping with
their strongly held beliefs .... Their apparent lack of interest in him, in
short, far from being testimony to their inability to control him, may in fact
be testimony to his ability to discern the matters on which they feel
28
intensely and vote according to their preferences.
In other words, even when citizens seem to ignore congressional affairs, their
opinions and preferences may yet influence votes on the floor of Congress.
What is more, public opinion can impact congressional votes on
individual issues, even though no single issue may decide an election.
Members know that each vote against constituent preferences erodes
electoral support, and exposes them to attacks both from within and from
outside their party. 29 Even if the impact of any one vote on their re-election
prospects may be small, the stakes involved are extremely high.30 The loss of
an election may be devastating, particularly for the many members of
Congress who expect to serve long careers in the Capitol. In addition,
uncertainty looms over elections; factors outside their control (the redrawing
of congressional districts by state legislatures, national scandals, and so on)
may dim incumbents' otherwise bright re-election prospects. Hence, to
minimize the risks, members tend to vote in line with constituent preferences
on one issue after another. In fact, even in so-called "safe" districts/states, in
which incumbents expect little opposition, members of Congress commonly
believe they can vote against constituent preferences on only a small number
31
of issues without seriously jeopardizing their careers.
To be sure, I do not claim that every action Congress takes necessarily
reflects what most citizens would want. Sometimes members of Congress
may do what they deem is best for the nation, even if their constituents
disagree. Sometimes they may put the concerns of special interests ahead of
those of most constituents. Sometimes they may pursue their own selfish
interests. Nonetheless, by and large, Congress acts as though the public holds
the reins. As Professor Daryl Levinson has opined, "government behavior is
driven more by the interests and preferences of constituents than by those of
government officials," leading him to conclude that we ought to "worry less

28 KINGDON, supra note 18,

at 41.

29 See id.; see also Miller & Stokes, supra note 22, at 55.

30 See KINGDON, supra note 18, at 62 (reasoning that politicians play it safe when
voting, "even though.., the loss of a significant number of votes in the next election
really is not at issue," because the cost of losing an election is so high).
31 Id.(observing that incumbents may be secure precisely "because they were
careful about catering to their constituencies"); Miller & Stokes, supra note 22, at 55.
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about Leviathan and more about Leviathan's democratic masters. '32 In short,
to ascertain what powers Congress will- try to exercise, free of judicial
constraints, it is essential to know what citizens demand of it. It is to that task
that the next three Parts turn.
III. THE PEOPLE VS. STATES' RIGHTS

Once we recognize that state power is at the mercy of ordinary citizens
who hold Congress's reins, we must next ascertain what sort of laws citizens
will. demand from Congress, particularly on issues affecting states' rights.
Parts 111-V complete this task. In this Part, I review the conventional notion
that citizens, left to their own devices, would eagerly expand congressional
power to include many issues the states instead ought to control, thereby
endangering the long-term viability of our federal system and the values
attributed to it.
The problem identified in the literature is not that citizens demand
congressional action per se, for there are many issues on which federal action
is (at least arguably) normatively desirable. Citizens may ask Congress to
provide certain public goods the states alone cannot provide (e.g., counterterrorism operations), to address problems that straddle state borders (e.g., air
pollution), or to prevent the states from engaging in a race to the bottom
(e.g., in the provision of welfare benefits); 33 public demands motivated by
such concerns generally do not cause alarm (except among some
originalists). While originalists might object to any expansion of
34 most
congressional authority beyond what the Framers envisioned,
scholars-as did even the Rehnquist Court-have acknowledged that
Congress must play a much more expansive role today than the Framers may
35
ever have imagined or intended.
32 Levinson, supra note 1, at 972.
33 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 405-09 (1987)
(stating economic rationales for federal control: to provide public goods, to address
externalities, and to prevent the race to the bottom). For a discussion of the economic
basis for federal action, see ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CoNsTrruTIoN 105-108

(2000).
34 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586-89 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (insisting that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate only the
buying and selling of goods and services and not all activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce).
35 In United States v. Lopez, for example, the Rehnquist Court declined to overrule
any of the Court's earlier decisions that had sustained expansive congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause. 514 U.S. 549, 549-68 (1995). See Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 155-57 (1971) (affirming Congress's power to regulate loan-sharking);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62, (1964) (upholding
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Instead, the real problem is that citizens may demand congressional
action on issues (including some moral issues, for example) beyond the core
that most commentators would concede are national in scope. 36 The
conventional wisdom suggests several reasons why citizens are tempted to
seek congressional legislation on such issues, even though the normative
justification for federal control is weak or hotly contested. Given the
temptation to federalize, citizens face a collective action problem. Society as
a whole may be better off leaving certain issues to the states, but if enough
citizens stand to gain by federalizing these issues, nothing will stop them
from doing so (given their influence over Congress) and, in the, process,
37
jeopardizing the values attributed to our federal system.
One reason citizens may be tempted to aggrandize congressional powers
vis-6-vis the states is that through Congress they can impose their morals on
people living in other states. 38 Consider recent efforts to pass a national ban
on same-sex marriages. When a Massachusetts court recognized same-sex
marriages, 39 it sparked a national outcry. Groups around the country sought
to overturn the ruling by amending the Federal Constitution, even though
(arguably) the ruling would have no legal effect outside Massachusetts (or at
1964 Civil Rights Act ban on discrimination in places of public accommodation);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of homegrown wheat). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (upholding federal ban
on medical marijuana).
36 For a discussion of the issues that should be handled locally, see, for example,
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalismas Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 769,
770 (2006) (suggesting that issues which raise "passionate and irreconcilable religious or
ideological differences" among the populace should be addressed at the state or local
level).
37 Preserving the states from federal encroachments is said to serve at least three
important purposes. First, by establishing two independent sources of authority, and
dividing power between them, federalism is thought to protect the people from the threat
of a tyrannical centralized government. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison),
reprinted in THE FEDERALIST 347, 351 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The different
governments will control each other."). Second, decentralization of policymaking also
improves the fit between a state's policies and the preferences of that state's people, since
each state can adopt policies that match its citizens' preferences better than uniform
national legislation ever could. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1494 (1987). Third, states can serve as
laboratories for new policies to be tested and evaluated. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38 Baker, supra note 6, at 962 (citing a national ban on polygamy as an example);
Baker & Young, supra note 6, at 121-24 (citing Fugitive Slave Act); Macey, supranote
2, at 272 (suggesting citizens may prefer federal law because it is more difficult for others
to avoid).
39 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,973 (Mass. 2003).
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least none which the states themselves could not address) 40 and even though
we may all agree (in the abstract) that we would be better off, collectively, if
marriage were defined exclusively by the states. When citizens seek to
impose their morals through legislation, it is easy to see why Congress may
be their instrument of choice, given the broader jurisdictional reach of its
41
laws.
Similarly, citizens may back federalization to preempt the laws of their
own state. When citizens are unhappy with a law of their own state, but
cannot change it (say, because they are in the minority on the issue within the
state), they may petition Congress to usurp control of the domain-to get a
second bite at the apple. 42 Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that sixty
percent of the entire nation opposes physician-assisted suicide (PAS), but
that only forty percent of Oregon residents feel the same way. Oregon
residents who oppose PAS may not be able to convince the state to ban it, so
they may ask Congress to do so instead. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
expect that the incentive to seek congressional action is even stronger when it
is motivated by a desire to change the law of one's own state, rather than the
law of another state, and may arise with respect to any sort of state law (and
not just laws regulating morality). For instance, disgruntled state residents
may ask Congress to reduce their property taxes, to mandate standardized
tests for all elementary students, or to impose stiff punishment on criminals,
even if they do not necessarily care to impose these policies on people living
elsewhere. Once again, although society might be better off entrusting these
issues to the states, citizens will be tempted to wield federal power over them
when they are dissatisfied with state policies.
A third reason citizens may opt for congressional action is that
collectively they may find it cheaper-in terms of the political and/or
financial capital required-to achieve some end via Congress than through

40 Arguably, no other state could be forced to recognize a same-sex marriage
performed in Massachusetts. For one thing, the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) explicitly grants states authority to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
performed elsewhere. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). States may also refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages on grounds of public policy (though this power too, has been
questioned). For a discussion of this exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause (as
well as DOMA), see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).

This incentive probably exists only with respect to legislation regulating morality.
It is easy to imagine an outsider wanting to ban same-sex marriages in Massachusetts; it
is more difficult to imagine an outsider wanting to abolish high property taxes there.
42 Cf Friedman, supra note 33, at 373-74 (suggesting that it has "bec[o]me
commonplace for those who ha[ve] not prevailed in the state legislatures to leapfrog over
their head[s] to Congress").
41
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multiple state legislatures. 43 For instance, imagine some new issue arises that
requires the attention of either Congress or the fifty state legislatures.
Suppose as well that it costs $1 million to lobby for legislative action on the
issue, regardless of the size of the jurisdiction; citizens with a common
agenda may pool their resources and seek the legislation they desire through
Congress (at a cost of $1 million), rather than through the fifty state
44
legislatures (at a cost of $50 million).
In a similar vein, citizens may seek to transfer control of a state program
in order to shift a portion of its costs onto out-of-state taxpayers (creating a
free-rider problem, in economics terms). 4 5 To illustrate, imagine a federation
comprised of three states (A, B, C), two of which (A and B) are facing toxic
spills that will cost $100 million apiece to clean up. If we assume federal
taxes are apportioned evenly across all three states, the residents of A and B
have an incentive to federalize the clean-up efforts since one-third of the total
cost would be borne by state C's taxpayers. Residents of state C may
object-after all, they have nothing to gain from federalization-but they
46
may not control enough votes to block national legislation on the issue.
In sum, given the jurisdictional reach, preferred content, and cost
advantages of federal law, ordinary citizens may demand congressional
action on a wide range of issues on which the standard normative case for
federal intervention (say, to address externalities) is tenuous. This suggests
citizens cannot be trusted to safeguard state prerogatives, for the temptation
to wield congressional power is simply too great. Citizens face a collective
action problem. Even if they could all agree that Congress should control
43 Cf Macey, supra note 2, at 271.
44 This example probably overstates Congress's lobbying cost advantages. Since it
will rarely be necessary to change the laws of all fifty states, and since it probably costs
less to lobby a single state than it does to lobby the national government, it may be
cheaper to amend the laws of outlier states than it is to enact new federal legislation. Cf
id. at 282.
45 Similarly, citizens may support conditional federal grants on the theory that some
states will refuse the grants because they object to the conditions, leaving more federal
funds for states supporting the conditions. See Baker, supra note 6, at 962-63 (suggesting
that citizens may try to capture federal funds by placing conditions on federal grants that
put other states at a disadvantage); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and
States'Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 108 (2001). The populist
safeguards may not adequately protect the states from the conditional spending power.
See infra Part VI.B.
46

But cf DEAN LACY, A CuRious PARADOX OF THE RED STATES AND BLUE STATES:

FEDERAL SPENDING AND ELECTORAL VOTES IN THE 2000 ELECTION 2 (Mar. 2002),
("It
http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/hweisberg/conference/Lacy-OSUConf.pdf
would make sense that ... the states that gain [financially] from the federal government
would support the candidate who would protect or increase federal spending... [but the]
evidence shows that such a story is exactly backwards.").
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only some issues, they have strong incentives to cheat on that bargain-to
wield federal power whenever Congress promises to give them the outcome
they prefer. Since citizens hold Congress's reins, judicial review is necessary
to prevent Congress from imposing uniform national solutions on many
issues currently-and more properly-handled by the states. Or so the
conventional wisdom says.
IV.CONGRESS'S (RELATIVE) INABILITY TO SATISFY MAJORITY
PREFERENCES

Parts IV and V contain the core contributions of this Article. In this Part,
I show that even assuming that citizens would, in the abstract, want Congress
to usurp state powers (for the reasons just discussed), their demands will
rarely be met because Congress cannot satisfy majority policy preferences as
closely as can the states. To be sure, members of Congress may campaign
for, vote for, and even sponsor legislation sought by constituents without
regard to state prerogatives. Nevertheless, on many issues, these proposals
will fail to attract widespread support, and Congress will be unable to pass
47
legislation.
The explanation stems from the shape of national public opinion and the
relatively cumbersome design of the federal lawmaking process. First, due to
the sheer size and diversity of the national polity, public opinion on many
issues is fragmented at the national level, suggesting that many citizens
would deem any congressional proposal-or more precisely, any
congressionalproposal that stands a chance ofpassing-inferiorto existing
state policy. If citizens only want Congress to pass laws that embody their
own (idiosyncratic) policy preferences, congressional proposals will often
fail to garner majority support, in spite of the benefits that federalization
supposedly offers.4 8 Second, certain features of the national lawmaking
process, such as bicameralism and the Senate filibuster, hinder efforts to
enact legislation at the federal level even when the national majority favors
the same policy and could, absent these procedural hurdles, push satisfactory

47 On this matter, it is telling that, of the 8,621 bills introduced in the 108th
Congress, only 498 (or roughly 6%) were actually enacted into law. Paul Jenks,
CongressLine by GalleryWatch.com: A Bill in Congress, GALLERYWATCH.COM, Feb. 7,

2006, http://www.llrx.com/congress/billincongress.htm. See also Clark, supra note 2, at
1325 (noting that "thousands of bills are introduced in Congress [every year], but only a
small number pass both Houses and are signed into law by the President").
48 See Macey, supra note 2, at 281-82 (arguing that when interest groups in
different states favor different policies, they may prefer to regulate matters at the local
level, rather than through Congress).
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legislation through Congress. 49 In short, even when citizens otherwise favor
federalization, they may not agree upon the precise content of legislation,
making it difficult for proponents to run the gauntlet of the federal
lawmaking process. By virtue of congressional inaction, state prerogatives
will be preserved. (In the next Part, by contrast, I suggest several: reasons
why citizens might not even want Congress to act, even when it could, in
fact, give them the policy outcome most would prefer.)

A. The Shape of NationalPublic Opinion
On many important issues today national public opinion is fragmented;
that is, no one position on the issue garners majority support. Consider
opinion on the legal status of same-sex couples. In one recent poll, for
example, public opinion was fragmented, with 25% of respondents
supporting legal recognition of same-sex marriages; 35% supporting
recognition of civil unions, but not marriages; 37% supporting recognition of
50
neither; and 3% reporting no opinion.
Opinion within individual states, however, tends to be much more
cohesive; 5 1 in other words, a majority of citizens within a state may favor
one policy above all others, even if citizens across the country do not. What
is more, the specific policy favored by the majority will likely differ across
states. 52 States are, after all, unique civil societies. 53 Citizens of one state
might prefer to ban smoking in places of public accommodation, citizens of a
second state might opt to require special smoking sections in such places,

49 See Clark, supra note 2, at 1329 (suggesting that by making it very difficult to
enact federal laws, the Constitution "leave[s] the states free to govern").
50
National Election Pool Poll, Nov. 2, 2004, Public Opinion Online, The Roper
Center at the University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online, accession no. 1615384,
available in LEXIsNEXIs ACADEMIC [hereinafter Roper Center Database]. See also
CNN/USA Today Poll, Mar. 18-20, 2005, Roper Center Database, supra, accession no.
1621899 (20% support same-sex marriages; 27% support civil unions, but not marriages;
45% oppose both marriages and civil unions; 8% expressed no opinion).
51 Cf DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 18-22
(3d ed. 1984) (finding most states enjoy strong in-state unity, particularly in the face of
external pressures).
52 ERiKSoN & TEDIN, supra note 20, at 264-67 (noting significant policy differences
across states on many issues). See also Macey, supra note 2, at 281 (opining that "the
political-support-maximizing solution at the national level may differ from many,
perhaps most, of the local solutions").
53 ELAZAR, supra note 51, at 112 (suggesting that American states harbor distinct
political subcultures).

1686

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 68:1669

while citizens of a third state might prefer not to regulate smoking at all, and
54
so on.
It follows that legislation crafted by state governments often will satisfy
more citizens than will uniform national legislation. 55 Indeed, one of the
values of maintaining the federal system in the first place hinges on the
notion that-compared to the federal government-states can adopt laws that
56
more closely match citizen policy preferences.
Still, commentators often fail to appreciate how this benefit of federalism
also serves to protect states' rights from federal encroachment. If states can
come closer to satisfying the policy preferences of their residents, then the
proponents of national legislation should be unable to muster enough votes in
the Congress to preempt state authority. 57 Any legislation introduced in
Congress will face stiff opposition from members whose constituents (on the
whole) prefer one of the various alternatives. After all, these constituents can
always turn to their state (or local) government to adopt the policy they most
prefer; thus, they are likely to support federalization only when Congress can
give them some policy that is superior to, or at least as good as, the policy
offered by their state or local government (as just discussed, a very difficult
condition for Congress to satisfy). 58 Simply put, citizens do not need to
accept compromises from Congress. A preference of the content of state
legislation thus gives citizens a powerful incentive to oppose the diminution
of state authority.
To illustrate, suppose citizens of the nation take three distinct positions
regarding how, if at all, government should give parents a say when a child
54 See Ctr. for Disease Control, State Smoking Restrictions for Private-Sector
Worksites, Restaurants, and Bars-UnitedStates, 1998 and 2004, 54 (26) MoRBIDITY &

MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
649, 649-53
(July 8,
2005),
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5426.pdf (showing that none of the four
approaches to regulating smoking in restaurants has been adopted by more than twentyone states).
55 Charles Tiebout's seminal work on the political economy of public goods
provides a firm rationale for expecting a higher degree of correspondence between state
public opinion and state policy, in comparison with national public opinion and federal
policy. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416,416 (1956).
56 E.g., Friedman, supra note 33, at 386-87 (noting the efficiency argument).
57 Cf Macey, supra note 2, at 282 (suggesting interest groups will pressure
Congress to respect local authority when they prefer the content of a local rule to the
content of the rule that Congress would otherwise enact).
i 58 As Herbert Wechsler explains: "[H]ostility to Washington may rest far less on
pure devotion to the principle of local government than on opposition to specific

measures which Washington proposes to put forth. This explanation does not make the
sentiment the less centrifugal in its effects." Wechsler, supra note 2, at 552.
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under age eighteen seeks an abortion: one-third of the public supports a law
that would require a minor to obtain her parents' consent before having an
abortion; one-third favors a law that would require parental notification, but
not consent; and one-third favors a law that would grant the minor an
unrestricted right to an abortion. Some citizens may petition Congress for
legislation, seeking to impose their view throughout the nation; but any
proposal to require (or not require) parental consent or notification would be
a non-starter at the federal level; the law would be seen as objectionable-or
at least, as a second-best solution-by two-thirds of the public. But citizens
favoring each approach might fare better at the state level. The citizens
wanting parental consent may constitute a majority in some states; the
citizens favoring free access may constitute the majority in another block of
states; and so on. After all, there may be a majority position on the issue at
the state level even if there is none at the national level. 59 In sum, citizens in
many states may be happier with state policy; they may thus oppose attempts
to enact preemptive federal legislation, whether or not they care about
"federalism" as such.
B. The Structure of Congress (andof State Lawmaking)
It is true, of course, that national opinion is not always so fragmented. On
60
the surface, at least, there is strong national support for the death penalty,
voluntary prayer in public schools, 6 1 and standardized testing. 62 Nothing

59 States have taken four distinct approaches to requiring parental
consent/notification for abortions for minors, none of which has been adopted by a
majority of states (suggesting that public opinion is more homogeneous within most
states than it is at the national level). Twenty-two states require parental consent; eleven
require parental notification; two require both consent and notification; and fifteen states
require neither consent nor notification. Furthermore, these tallies mask many subtle (and
not so subtle) differences among state laws of any one type; for instance, some states
require the consent of both parents, while other states require the consent of only one
parent, or even allow grandparents (or other relatives) to provide the requisite consent
instead. See Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws

(Aug. 2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOAL.pdf.
60 Pew Research Center Poll, Dec. 7-11, 2005, Roper Center Database, supra note
50, accession no. 1638949 (62% of respondents favor the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder; 30% oppose it, and 8% were unsure).
61 E.g., CNN/USA Today Poll, Aug. 8-11, 2005, Roper Center Database, supra note
50, accession no. 1632339 (76% of respondents favor a constitutional amendment to
allow voluntary prayer in public schools).
62 E.g., CBS/New York Times Poll, Jan. 12-15, 2004, Roper Center Database, supra
note 50, accession no. 0446891 (71% of respondents support annual mandatory testing of
students in public schools; only 25% opposed it).
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discussed thus far would block the majority from imposing its will on the
63
entire nation on these issues.
Nonetheless, the design of the national lawmaking process may foil
attempts to pass congressional legislation even when a national majority
backs one policy approach. It protects state prerogatives not by reducing the
demand for federal legislation, but by further frustrating congressional efforts
a de facto supermajority
to satisfy that demand, 64 namely, by imposing
65
legislation.
federal
requirement on any new
Consider the allocation of seats in the House and Senate. Just because
proponents of congressional legislation have the backing of the popular
majority does not necessarily mean they control enough seats in Congress to,
enact the legislation. On the one hand, citizens in the majority may be
heavily concentrated in a small number of congressional districts and thus
may be unable to sway the votes of more than half of the seats in the House
of Representatives. On the other hand, opponents of the proposal, though
outnumbered in the House, may yet control a majority of seats in the Senate,
which are not allocated based on population; or, at the very least, they may
control enough Senate seats (forty-one) to sustain a filibuster of the
measure. 6 6 Either way, by default of congressional inaction, the issue will
remain in the hands of state governments. The system of separation of
powers-and perhaps most importantly, the presidential veto--further
reinforces the ability of minority interest groups to block popular national
67 .
legislation, thereby helping to preserve states' rights.
63 E.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 222 ("Preferences in Congress are aggregated on a
nationwide basis ... [and] if interests in an area represented by a majority of these
legislators concur, interests in the rest of the country will be subordinated.").
64 SANFORD

LEVINSON,

OUR

UNDEMOCRATIC

CONSTITUTION

34-40

(2006)

(discussing various features of the federal government, including bicameralism and the
presidential veto, that hinder passage of federal laws); Clark, supra note 2, at 1344-45
(suggesting that separation of powers principles, including bicameralism and
presentment, help to safeguard state powers simply by making it more difficult to enact
federal legislation); Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and
the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEXAs L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2000) ("[T]he
ultimate political safeguard may be the procedural gauntlet that any legislative proposal
must run and the concomitant difficulty of overcoming legislative inertia.").
65 See Clark, supra note 2, at 1339 (concluding that "[m]ultiple veto gates establish,
in effect, a supermajority requirement" for new federal laws).
66 Currently, it takes sixty votes in the Senate to end a filibuster. See SENATE COMM.
ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 102-25, at 15-16

(1992), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.php (last visited Nov. 27,
2007) (Rule XXII requires a three-fifths vote for cloture).
67 Clark, supra note 2, at 1324. Wechsler posits a number of other features of the
national political system that reinforce the ability of minority interest groups to block
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The argument, of course, is still incomplete. Just because the states are
"free to govern ' 68 does not necessarily mean the states will actually govern.
Congressional inaction is a necessary but not sufficient condition for state
supremacy in a field. We must also consider whether the states are any less
encumbered, and hence, whether they can more easily meet the people's
demands for legislative action.
In many respects, it is easier to pass populist legislation at the state level.
To be sure, state governments must overcome some of the same obstacles
that make it difficult to marshal populist legislation through Congress (e.g.,
all states save Nebraska employ bicameral legislatures and recognize
gubernatorial vetoes), but the structural barriers are less daunting at the state
level. 6 9 For one thing, as a matter of federal constitutional law, states must
70
apportion seats in both houses of the state legislature on a population basis.
In other words, states may not give minority interests a comparatively greater
voice in a Senate-like institution. What is more, many state constitutions
adopt lawmaking procedures that are comparatively easy for simple
majorities to satisfy. In thirteen states, for example, the legislature may
override a gubernatorial veto with less than a two-thirds majority (indeed, six
states require only a majority vote in the legislature). 7 1 More importantly,
twenty-four states empower voters to enact legislation or constitutional
amendments directly, bypassing the state legislature (and many antimajoritarian procedural safeguards) altogether.72 (It is worth noting that four
more states allow voters to pass laws or amendments previously submitted to
the state legislature, and all fifty states employ some version of the

unfavorable national legislation, including state control over the drawing of congressional
districts and the Electoral College. See generally Wechsler, supra note 2, at 546-51.
68 Clark, supranote 2, at 1329.
69 For a brief overview of the structure of lawmaking in the fifty states, see Daniel
B. Rodriguez, TurningFederalismInside Out: IntrastateAspects of InterstateRegulatory
Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 162-71 (1996).
70 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
requires both houses of a state legislature to be apportioned on a population basis."). The
Court rejected the analogy to the structure of the federal Congress, opining that no
"inequitable state legislative apportionment scheme" could be justified by the federal
analogy, i.e., the notion that seats in the federal Senate (and to a lesser extent, the House)
are not apportioned on a population basis. Id. at 575.
71 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 104 tbl.3.16 (2006).
72 INITIATIVE

&

REFERENDUM

INST.,

I

&

R

FACTSHEET

2

tbl.1.1,

http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact-Handouts.htm (follow "Number One: What
is the Initiative and Referendum Process?" hyperlink) (collecting data on direct
democracy practices used in all fifty states) (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
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referendum process, thereby allowing voters to reject legislation or
constitutional amendments passed by the legislature. 73)
Such majoritarian-friendly lawmaking processes clearly enhance the
states' advantage over Congress when it comes to satisfying local policy
preferences. Passing state legislation requires less overall support, and hence,
fewer compromises. To sum up, at the state level, citizens are not only more
likely to find majority support for their position on any issue, they are also
more likely to be able to translate majority support into actual legislation.
In addition, direct lawmaking procedures (such as ballot initiatives)
protect states by enabling state politicians to pass controversial issues on to
state voters, rather than to federal regulators. State and federal politicians
alike fear taking stances on controversial issues since doing so may cost them
votes needed for re-election. Hence, they may attempt to shift responsibility
for such issues onto some other government authority, perhaps another
decision maker within the same level of government (e.g., a court) or another
level of government. Some have argued that this gives state politicians a
powerful incentive to abet federalization-they would rather let federal
politicians suffer the electoral consequences of taking stands on controversial
issues like abortion, PAS, and so on-thereby undermining the political
safeguards. 74 (Of course, the same argument could be applied to federal
politicians: they might abstain from legislating in order to leave thorny issues
in the hands of their state counterparts. 75) However, state politicians can duck
controversial issues without necessarily federalizing them-namely, by
passing the buck to the voters via the initiative and referenda processes (at
least in states that utilize such processes). In other words, they do not need to
cede control of such issues to the federal government to avoid taking a stance
(though federal politicians would still need to cede control to state
governments to duck such issues). Thus, even when state politicians attempt
to dodge controversial issues, state prerogatives remain safe because the state
(broadly defined to include the voters) continues to handle them.
Furthermore, pro-majoritarian state lawmaking procedures may also
lessen Congress's supposed lobbying-cost advantages over the states. For
one thing, it may take more votes to pass legislation in Congress than to pass
legislation in a comparably sized state legislature (i.e., one with 535
members) that can override a veto with less than a two-thirds majority (or
vote cloture with less than sixty percent). Cynical though it seems, securing
more legislative votes requires more money and resources. What is more, it
73 Id.

74 Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 796-97 (1995).
75 See Macey, supra note 2, at 275 (suggesting that "Congress often can shift the
blame for controversial enactments ... by deferring to state legislators").
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may be cheaper to pass legislation via ballot measure than via legislature (be
it state or federal), regardless of governmental structure. Hence, citizens in
states utilizing direct democracy may prefer to spend their lobbying dollars at
home rather than in Washington, where they get less bang for the buck.

To summarize, even assuming citizens care only about public policyand recognize no jurisdictional limits on congressional power-the political
process still safeguards state prerogatives on many issues. The fragmentation
of national public opinion and the structural hurdles that must be overcome
to enact federal legislation suggest that Congress oftentimes will not be able
to give citizens what they want-laws embodying their own idiosyncratic
policy preferences. Given a preference for the content of state legislation,
citizens may not support federalization regardless of the benefits (e.g., the
opportunity to shift costs) it otherwise offers. Much of the allure of
federalization-the broad jurisdictional reach of federal law, for example-is
simply lost on citizens who deem congressional policy inferior to state/local
policy.

76

V. POPULIST DISTASTE FOR FEDERALIZATION

In the last Part, I argued that even if citizens are generally tempted to
expand federal power, as the conventional wisdom suggests, this does not
necessarily forebode the demise of the states. In order for Congress to
76 In

this Part, I have assumed that congressional proposals will preempt all state

legislation; but if Congress only establishes a floor (or ceiling), and does not preempt
state laws the majority deems preferable on the merits, citizens in the majority may yet
support the congressional legislation. However, it stands to reason that the temptation to
federalize will be less strong if Congress can only establish a floor (or ceiling). It is easy
to see why a citizen may want to impose her preferred policy on the entire nation, but it
is more difficult to see why the same citizen would want to impose some second-best
policy, particularly when many states (including her own, perhaps) have adopted her
preferred policy. It simply may not be worthwhile to spend the time and resources
necessary to lobby Congress to achieve such a result.
In addition, on some issues, it may not be possible for Congress to establish a floor
(or ceiling) that is acceptable to the majority. There may be so many policy options on
the table that Congress cannot identify the median position. Or the positions on the issue
may not align neatly along the same spectrum. Consider the issue of same-sex marriage.
Someone who favors legislation recognizing same-sex marriage, for example, may deem
federal legislation that only recognizes civil unions (i.e., sets a floor, but allows states to
recognize marriages as well) objectionable, since it could imply second-class status for
same-sex couples (even if it conveys some of the same benefits as marriage). This person
might prefer that Congress do nothing short of recognizing same-sex marriages.
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legislate, it must be able to satisfy the policy preferences of most citizens
across most states and congressional districts, and even that may not be
enough, given the anti-majoritarian structure of national lawmaking. On
many issues, state prerogatives will remain intact because of Congress's
inability to satisfy this (onerous) condition.
In this Part, I pose an even more fundamental challenge to the
conventional account of citizens as the catalysts of federalization. I identify
three reasons, largely overlooked in the literature, why citizens will oppose
congressional action, even when Congress can give them the policy outcome
most -prefer. First, citizens may fear that desirable congressional action on
one issue may spawn undesirable congressional action on other, related
issues. Second, citizens may dislike the way the Executive branch
administers federal law, and may thus prefer state-level administration.
Third, citizens value democratic processes, such as voter initiatives and even
federalism, and not just the outputs of those processes; they may object to
congressional actions that obstruct direct democracy, or that regulate issues
they believe ought to be handled by the states instead. Each of these
arguments chips away at the support for federalization, making it even less
likely that proponents of congressional legislation can overcome the daunting
procedural obstacles blocking their path.
A. Mission Creep
Up to now, I have assumed (pursuant to the conventional wisdom) that
citizens decide whether to support or oppose congressional legislation on one
issue without considering how it may impact other issues. Thus, for example,
a proposal to ban physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is just that, and no more;
it has no impact on other issues, such as the delivery of palliative care or the
termination of unwanted medical treatment. But legislation on one issue
often portends action on other issues as well. The passage of one law may
facilitate the passage of other laws for any number of reasons. For example,
the government may need to establish some new bureaucracy to enforce the
first law. It may be expensive to set up this bureaucracy, which will
undermine support for the initial legislation, but once the bureaucracy has
been established, the marginal cost of extending its jurisdiction over other,
related subjects will be relatively low. (A related concern, explored more
fully in the next section, is that the bureaucrats who are tasked with
administering the law may extend their jurisdiction without any further
action by the legislature.) A seemingly modest regulation may thus serve as a
launching pad for a far more ambitious (and perhaps unwelcome) regulatory
program down the road. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that when
citizens formulate opinions on proposed legislation they will consider how
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that legislation could affect government policy on other, related issues in the
future. ..
Indeed, studies suggest that public opinion towards any government
proposal often is conditioned by beliefs about what the government may (or
may not) try to do next on related issues. 77 Some citizens, for example, may
support government efforts to ban PAS, but only if they believe that
government will not also attempt to restrict access to palliative care; if they
fear that banning PAS will also curtail palliative care, they may prefer not.to
regulate PAS at all.
The fear that government action on one issue may pave the way. for
unwelcome government action on related issues (what I call "mission creep")
poses another obstacle for congressional efforts to federalize state policy
domains. A large majority may favor federal action on some issue (and for
all the wrong reasons), but some members of the majority may worry that
nationalizing this one issue will jeopardize state autonomy over other, related
issues in the future-issues on which they might prefer the policy pursued by
their state governments. To be sure, state legislatures may also spark fears of
mission creep (they too may attempt to expand their authority), but
congressional mission creep is apt to trigger much more alarm among
citizens. The primary reason is that if citizens must choose only one
government-either state or federal-to handle two (or more) related issues,
they are even more likely to choose state government than they would if they
were considering either issue alone. After all, Congress has a difficult enough
time satisfying policy preferences on any one issue in isolation; that
difficulty is compounded when Congress must address two issues
simultaneously.
.Consider national public opinion on two closely related issues: PAS and
the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment. The American public is
evenly divided on the issue of PAS (one poll shows that 46% favor PAS,
while 45% oppose it), but it is strongly in favor of permitting patients to
decline life-sustaining medical treatment (84% approve). 78 It is clear from
the data that many of those who want to ban PAS nonetheless oppose any
ban on the termination of medical treatment. Citizens concerned about
federal mission creep may thus oppose congressional legislation on a narrow
77 This possibility is captured by what political scientists call "nonseparable
preferences." Dean Lacy, A Theory ofNonseparablePreferences in Survey Responses, 45
AM. J. POL. Sci. 239, 241 (2001) ("A person's preference for the outcome of any single
issue or set of issues depends on the outcome of--or her beliefs about the outcome ofother issues."). Survey data suggest that non-separable preferences are quite common. Id.
at 243 (finding that "on nearly all of the issues, a substantial percentage of respondents
have nonseparable preferences").
78 Pew Research Center Poll, Nov. 9-25, 2005, Roper Center Database, supra note
50, accession no. 1639808.
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issue (say, PAS) in order to preserve state control over related issues (say,
refusal of treatment), particularly if they expect Congress to adopt an
79
objectionable approach on the second issue.
To illustrate how concerns over mission creep can defeat otherwise
popular congressional legislation, suppose citizens in a three-state federation
are considering whether to ban PAS. Each state has 100 citizens and, for ease
of illustration, receives one vote in the national legislature. The first column
of Table I lists the percentage of citizens in each state who support a ban.
Table 1. Policy Preferences Across Three States

(%)

Support ban on
termination of medical
treatment (%)

State A

60

40

State B

60

60

State C

40

60

Support ban on PAS

Aggregate

__53

53

As the table shows, large majorities in states A and B favor a ban. In the
aggregate, a majority (roughly 53%) of citizens across the three states
support the ban, suggesting one could be passed in the national legislature.
Suppose, however, citizens believe that passing a national ban on PAS would
facilitate passage of national legislation on other, related issues, such as the
termination of life-sustaining medical treatment. The decision regarding
whether to support the national law banning PAS thus becomes more
complex; it depends on what the national legislature is likely to do next
regarding the termination of medical treatment, and not just what the
legislature is currently proposing regarding PAS.
The second column of Table 1 lists the percentage of citizens who might
hypothetically support a ban on the termination of medical treatment. Once
79 Recall the public reaction to Congress's intervention in the Terry Schiavo case.
On March 21, 2005, Congress passed a private bill transferring jurisdiction over the
Schiavo case to the federal courts (which, like the Florida courts, ultimately refused to
block the removal of Schiavo's feeding tube). The congressional maneuver triggered a
backlash from the public, nearly two-thirds of which supported the decision to remove
the tube; and even among those who believed Schiavo should be kept alive, many
objected to Congress's intervention in the case, deeming it an issue the state should
handle. See Jay Bookman, Schiavo Case Shows Politics' Perilous Side, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION., Aug. 17, 2006, at 15A.
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again, majorities in two states support a ban on the merits, and in the
aggregate, a majority (again, 53%) of the nation's voters supports it. This
suggests such a ban could be passed in the national legislature. This time,
however, the majorities reside in states B and C. Some citizens in state A who
favor a ban on PAS also oppose a ban on the termination of life-sustaining
medical treatment. Citizens in State A may thus oppose national legislation to
ban PAS because it jeopardizes their power to regulate (or not regulate) at the
state level the termination of unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment as
well. They may prefer leaving that power intact, even if it means foregoing
the opportunity to impose their values on the citizens of state C, who, in the
absence of national legislation, would presumably allow PAS in that state. As
a consequence of the package of preferences among citizens in State A,
proponents lack majority support for a national ban on PAS. Neither issue
(PAS or termination of medical treatment) will be addressed at the national
level.
Indeed, political elites often seek to rally public opinion against
congressional proposals by evoking fear of federal mission creep. In other
words, elites (elected officials, public intellectuals, interest group leaders,
and so on) warn citizens that congressional proposals will open the door to
federal oversight in related policy domains in the future--domains in which
the public might prefer state policy on the merits. Two contemporary issues
highlight use of this tactic. Congressional leaders have twice attempted to
pass legislation that would trump Oregon's Death with Dignity Act-the law
legalizing PAS in that state. Opponents of the federal legislation have argued,
however, that it could have far-reaching consequences. Senator Ron Wyden
of Oregon, who opposes PAS and twice voted against state initiatives to
legalize it (as a private citizen of Oregon), nonetheless lobbied (successfully)
against one congressional proposal, invoking concerns over mission creep:
[The bill] would allow the federal government to intrude into the doctorpatient relationship at one of the most difficult and personal times of an
individual's life. Despite the language that was included concerning the
State's role, the effect would be the same. Physicians' fear of being
investigated by law enforcement and losing their ability to practice
medicine is going to result in less-aggressive pain relief for countless
patients. 80

80 Proposed Amendment to the Pain Relief Promotion Act: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22 (April 25, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wyden,

Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). See also Jeff Kosseff, Wyden Vows Fight on Bid to
Ban Assisted Suicide, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 14, 2005, at Al (quoting Sen. Wyden)
("[S]uch issues have historically been left to the states, and federal intervention would
reach beyond assisted suicide and have a devastating effect on how doctors nationwide
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Other elites opposed the congressional ban on PAS because of the
precedent that it would set in other areas, even beyond pain management.
Representative Ron Paul,. a Texas Republican, insisted that he opposed PAS,
and yet he spoke against the congressional ban, reasoning that, "If we're here
saying we should undo the Oregon -law, then what's to prevent us from
81
undoing the Texas [abortion] law that protects life?"
Similarly, opponents of the failed constitutional amendment to ban samesex marriage have stoked fear of mission creep to rally opposition to the
measure in Congress. For example, Representative Paul, in explaining his
opposition to the amendment to his (conservative) Texas constituents, opined
on the long-term ramifications of the measure: "a constitutional amendment
is not necessary to address the issue of gay marriage, and will only drive yet
another nail into the coffin of federalism. If we turn regulation of even
domestic family relations over to the federal government, presumably
anything can be federalized. '82 Such appeals-coming from savvy political
elites who know what resonates with their constituents-bolster my claim
that fears of federal mission creep may reduce popular support for
83
congressional legislation.
In sum, one reason citizens may oppose otherwise popular federal
legislation is that they fear the legislation opens the door for other
congressional initiatives they would not necessarily welcome. When citizens
form opinions on proposed legislation, they consider how that legislation will
affect government policies on related issues. State and federal legislatures
alike may spark fears of mission creep, but given the comparative difficulty
of satisfying policy preferences on a bundle of issues at the federal level,
citizens are likely to perceive federal mission creep as the greater threat,
particularly when they are exposed to campaigns stoking fears of
congressional mission creep. In short, citizens may oppose congressional
legislation on one issue-even legislation they otherwise favor-in order to
preserve state autonomy over a broader policy domain.
B. The Administration of Policies
Citizens may also oppose federalization, even when Congress can
legislate satisfactorily, because they may prefer to have their state
treat pain.").
81 Mark O'Keefe & Dave Hogan, House Votes to Block Suicide Law, OREGONIAN,
Oct. 28, 1999, at Al.
82 Ron Paul, Texas Straight Talk-Gay Marriage Quicksand (Mar. 1, 2004),
availableat http://www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2004/tstO3O 104.htm.
83 The suggestion that elites choose arguments because they resonate with ordinary
citizens is discussed in more detail in Part V.C.2.
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government, rather than the federal government, administer policy.
Legislation is often short on details, leaving many important and contentious
policy decisions to be made by the executive branch of government. 84 This
gives citizens a strong incentive to care about how government officials
(state and federal) would interpret and enforce legislation. And when it
comes to administering laws, many citizens deem state officials -to be
superior enforcement agents. For one thing, citizens, on average, believe
state officials are more competent, honest, and responsive administrators than
their federal counterparts. 85 In addition, citizens have comparatively more
control over executive (and judicial) officials in state government, many of
whom they can elect (or recall) directly at the ballot box. For both reasons,
citizens may oppose congressional legislation that places enforcement
authority in the hands of federal officials.
1. The Importance of Policy Administration
Although extant scholarship focuses primarily on the outputs of
legislatures, citizens may care as much (if not more) about how laws are
interpreted and executed. One reason is that executive officials, particularly
at thefederal level, may exert control over issues that, arguably, the drafters
of the legislation did not intend to cover. 86 The non-delegation doctrine
articulated by the Supreme Court places virtually no limits on Congress's
ability to delegate lawmaking power to the Executive. 87 Congress need only
lay down an "intelligible principle" for the Executive to follow. 88 By
contrast, most states enforce a more rigorous non-delegation doctrine, one
that requires the state legislature to provide specific standards to guide
agency policymaking. 89 Open-ended directives that would pass muster under
84 E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency
Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 305 (1988) ("Congress
typically leaves the vast majority of policy issues, including many of the most important
issues, for resolution by some other institution of government.").
85 See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 2, at 351-52.
86 This is similar to the concern discussed above over mission creep, only here it is
the Executive branch, rather than the Congress, that may enlarge the jurisdiction of the
federal government.
87 The doctrine has not been used to invalidate a congressional delegation since
1935. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
88 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
89 Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1189 (1999) ("Many
states require the legislature to provide specific standards to guide agency discretion in
the statute delegating authority to an agency."). Seven states employ a weak non-
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federal constitutional law may fail as a matter of state constitutional law. As
a consequence, citizens have less to fear from the agents of state government,
because their discretionary authority-and hence their ability to overreachis more constrained than that of their federal counterparts.
Recall Attorney General John Ashcroft's assertion that the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), a statute (arguably) designed to curtail recreational
drug abuse, had given him authority to issue an order banning PAS
throughout the nation. 90 Not surprisingly, the Court later ruled that Ashcroft
had overreached. It found that when Congress passed the CSA, nearly thirty
years before Ashcroft's order, it had not intended to give the Attorney
91
General authority to ban (or legalize) this admittedly controversial practice.
And the CSA is hardly the only statute on which federal officials have
arguably overstepped the limits of their delegated authority. 92 The possibility
that federal officials, sometimes decades after a statute is enacted and
following several changes of presidential administrations, may invoke
statutory authority in unexpected and unwelcome ways mitigates public
support for federalization.
A second misgiving about policy administration may arise even when the
executive's statutory authority is more carefully circumscribed. Under almost
any statute, executive branch officials (both state and federal) will have some
discretion in deciding how to enforce the law. Consider a hypothetical
statutory ban on PAS: "Any physician who knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide is guilty of a felony." 93 Unlike the CSA, such a
delegation doctrine (similar to the federal doctrine), upholding delegations without
specific standards so long as various procedural safeguards are in place. Id at 1192-93.
Twenty states employ a strong non-delegation doctrine, striking down state laws that do
not provide specific standards. Id. at 1196-97. The remaining twenty-three states employ
a moderate non-delegation doctrine, but one that still requires more specificity than the
federal non-delegation doctrine. Id.at 1198-1200.
90 The Attorney General's ruling was the subject of the Court's decision in Gonzales
v.Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006).
91 Id. at 259. Despite the fact that the Court blocked the Attorney General's order,
citizens may not deem judicial review an adequate check on executive power. The result
in Gonzales v. Oregon was somewhat atypical, given that federal courts usually defer to
executive interpretations of statutory authority. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
92 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (invalidating Corps of Engineers' assertion of authority over
isolated bodies of water as exceeding its mandate under Clean Water Act); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-87 (1991) (upholding agency's interpretation of
"ambiguous" Title X language; agency denied funds to organizations that engaged in
abortion counseling and referrals).
93 This statute is similar to the state law upheld by the Supreme Court in Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the case in which the Court found no constitutional
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statute clearly prohibits PAS, but officials must still decide how to administer
the law. Should they enforce the ban strictly and prosecute every case in
which a doctor has prescribed a lethal dosage of medication? Or should they
show leniency in exceptional cases? If lenity is called for, what cases should
they deem exceptional? If resources are limited, what cases should be
prioritized? Should authorities prosecute doctors who prescribe lethal doses
ostensibly to alleviate the patient's chronic pain (the dilemma of double
effect)? Or should they dismiss such cases in order to preserve the patient's
access to palliative care? The PAS ban raises such issues but does not resolve
them; citizens may worry, for example, that officials of one government
would enforce the ban too vigorously, prosecuting well-intentioned doctors
under the statute. 94 Hence, citizens may compare how state and federal
officials would likely handle these issues before endorsing any congressional
proposal to ban PAS.
2. Comparative Trust
Given that legislative proposals delegate so much authority to executive
branch officials (particularly at the federal level), citizens will want to know
how these officials will use their power. It is true, of course, that both state
and federal officials could abuse their statutory authority, or enforce laws in
objectionable ways. Nevertheless, citizens are likely to believe that
delegating any quantum of policymaking authority to federal officials carries
far more risks, for two main reasons.
One reason is that, on average, citizens trust their state (and local)
governments more than they trust the federal government. 95 In relevant part,
trust denotes citizens' expectations about how government (state or federal)
will utilize the power at its disposal. 96 In deciding how much to trust one
level of government, citizens consider several variables, including the
government's competence, its responsiveness to ordinary citizens, and its
right to assisted suicide.
94 The concern is far from hypothetical: the federal Drug Enforcement Agency has
recently prosecuted doctors who have over-prescribed painkillers for manslaughter or
even murder. Tina Rosenberg, Weighing the Difference Between Treating Pain and
Dealing Drugs,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A12 (discussing cases).
95 Cf Pettys, supra note 2, at 333 (suggesting that because of their "trust,
confidence, allegiance, or loyalty" in state government, the people may be willing to give
states more regulatory responsibility).
96 E.g., Jack Citrin & Samantha Luks, Political Trust Revisited. Deji Vu All Over
Again?, in WHAT ISITABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 12-13 (John R.
Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001). For a helpful review of the political
science literature on trust in government, see Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political
Trust and Trustworthiness, ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 475 (2000).
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integrity. 97 On these and related matters, the public holds state (and local)
governments in greater esteem. On average, citizens have more faith in state
government to"do the right thing," they have significantly higher confidence
in the ability of the state government to solve problems effectively, they
believe they get more "bang for the buck" from state government, they see
the state government as significantly more responsive than the federal
government, and they see state government as less corrupt.9 8 These findings
are consistent across nationally representative surveys. 99 In the 1996
National Election Study, for example, more than two-thirds of respondents
said they placed the most trust in state or local government; only 29% said
the same of the federal government.10 0
In large part, the fact that citizens, on average, trust state governments
more reflects their belief that state governments do a better job administering
policy--of executing policy honestly, competently, efficiently, and in
accordance with their preferences. In other words, citizens trust state
governments more for reasons that may have little to do with the content of
.

97 E.g., Virginia A. Chanley et. al, Public Trust in Government
in the Reagan Years
and Beyond, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 76-78
(John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (suggesting that the competence
of a government's leaders-and not the policies it adopts-is one of the most important
determinants of trust in that government); M. Kent Jennings, Political Trust and the
Roots ofDevolution, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 232 (Valerie Braithwhite & Margarets
Levi eds., 1998).
98 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION ET AL., ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT STUDY

(2000), available at http:www.ropercenter.uconn.edu (follow "Topics at a Glance"
hyperlink; then follow "Role of Government" hyperlink; then follow "Kaiser Family
Foundation/Harvard/NPR Poll: Attitudes Toward Government Study-View Details
[United States: 2000]" hyperlink). This nationally representative survey of 1,557 adults
was conducted in May-June 2000 and was commissioned by National Public Radio, the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University's Kennedy School of
Government.
99

E.g., JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 98-100 (2002); PHILLIP
W. ROEDER, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN STATES 43

(1994); Richard L. Cole & John Kincaid, Public Opinion on U.S. Federal and
IntergovernmentalIssues in 2006: Continuity and Change, 36 PUBLIuS: J. FEDERALISM
443 (2006); Marc J. Hetherington & John D. Nugent, Explaining Public Support for
Devolution: The Role of Political Trust, in WHAT is IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT

AMERICANS DISLIKE? 134 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001);
Jennings, supra note 97; John Kincaid & Richard L. Cole, Changing Public Attitudes on
Power and Taxation in the American Federal System, 31 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 205,
207-08 (2001).
10 0

AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, ANES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE 1948-

2004 [hereinaftcr ANES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE], http://www.electionstudies.orgi
studypages/cdf/cdf.htm (on file with author).
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the laws adopted by Congress or their state legislatures.' 0 ' Hence, citizens
who trust their state government more than the federal government have an
incentive to oppose efforts to take an issue out of the hands of state
authorities, even if they would otherwise support congressional legislation
(e.g., because of its content, its jurisdictional reach, its cost-shifting
advantages, and so on).
A growing body of empirical research supports the notion that trust in
state governments dampens support for the federalization of state policy
domains. For example, in one recent study with political scientist Cindy
Kam, I examined whether trust judgments affected public support for a
proposed congressional ban on PAS, using results from a large nationally
representative survey experiment. 102 In the study, 672 adult subjects were
asked, among other things, which level of government-state or federalthey trusted more and whether they would rather government (not specifying
state or federal) allow or proscribe PAS. Later, they were told that Congress
was considering legislation that would ban PAS nationwide. Not
surprisingly, subjects who thought PAS should be banned were more
supportive of the congressional proposal than were subjects who thought
PAS should be allowed-that is, people considered policy outcomes when
03
evaluating congressional proposals.1
Contrary to popular wisdom, however, we found that policy preferences
do not tell the whole story; statistical analyses of responses showed that some
subjects who thought PAS ought to be banned nonetheless opposed
Congress's effort to do so. 10 4 In particular, subjects who placed more trust in
their state government were more opposed to the congressional ban than
were subjects who placed more trust in the federal government, holding all
else constant (opposition increased by twelve percentage points; these results
were statistically significant). 105 Indeed, the results indicated that

101 When asked to describe why they do mistrust the federal government, Americans
point to inefficiency in the federal government, over-responsiveness to special interests,
cheap talk, and lack of integrity among elected officials. Shared values on legislative
policy outcomes were only secondary concerns. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION ET AL.,
supra note 98. To the extent that comparative trust merely reflects one's agreement or
disagreement with the content of congressional policy, it would not provide an
independent check on the expansion of federal power.
102 Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism?An
Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007).
103 Id. at 613-14.
104 Id. at 615-18.
105Id. at 615.
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comparative trust in the states could sway public opinion against
106
congressional proposals that the majority otherwise favors on the merits.
Similarly, other empirical studies, virtually ignored by the legal
academy, have shown that evaluations of the comparative trustworthiness of
the federal and state governments helps to explain citizen support for the
devolution of policy making responsibilities to the states that occurred during
the 1980s and 1990s.107 Citizens supported the transfer of powers to the
states at the same time they began to trust the states more than the federal
government. They trusted states more at least in part because they saw the
state governments as more competent, more accountable, and more honest.10 8
In other words, support for devolution reflected more than mere agreement
with the policies pursued by the states; it was also driven by trust in state
governments relative to the federal government.
To be sure, there is no guarantee that citizens will always consider the
federal government less trustworthy than the states, 10 9 and hence, no
guarantee that these feelings will always check the expansion of federal
power. Indeed, as recently as the late 1960s, citizens on average actually
considered the federal government slightly more trustworthy."I 0 Still, state
1061Id.
107 See, e.g., Hetherington & Nugent, supra note 99, at 134; Greg M. Shaw &
Stephanie L. Reinhart, The Polls: Devolution and Confidence in Government, 65 PUB.
OPINION Q. 369, 369 (2001) (noting that devolution followed a decline in confidence in
the federal government).
108 Hetherington & Nugent, supra note 99, at 134 (attributing public support for
devolution to the "widespread efforts of nearly all state governments over the past thirty
years in terms of constitutional revision, legislative reapportionment and
professionalization, strengthening executive authority, and increasing fiscal capacity").
Some scholars also say that citizens demanded the power shift because of a loss of
confidence in the competence of the federal government. Id. at 135. For present purposes,
however, it does not matter whether citizens support devolution of powers because their
absolute trust in the states increased (because the states have proven their worth) or
whether it was because their confidence in the federal government simply decreased
(because the federal government broke promises, managed policies ineptly, and so forth);
in either case, the relative standing of the states was the trigger for devolution, and the
effect is the same.
109 This is particularly evident in times of war or national emergency. THE
FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 315-23 (noting that support for
the national government swelled during the Revolutionary War, but quickly waned
thereafter); John R. Alford, We're All in This Together, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT
GovERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?

45 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-

Morse eds., 2001) (hypothesizing that trust in the federal government may rise in the
presence of an external threat to the nation).
I10 The ANES tracked comparative trust on the 1968, 1972, 1974, 1976, and 1996
surveys. On the 1968 survey, 39% of respondents indicated they placed the most faith
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and local governments arguably have an inherent advantage over the federal
government when it comes to earning and keeping the people's trust, due
both to their close proximity to the people I ' and the nature of the affairs
they handle (e.g., their capacity as first-responders to crime). 1 12 Anyway,
and confidence in the federal government, whereas 38% said the same of their state or
local government. (The remaining 23% trusted all governments equally or responded
"[d]on't know.") Only four years later, however, state and local governments had the
edge (46% to 40%). ANES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE, supra note 100. As noted in the
text, by 1996, 67% of respondents said they had the most faith in either their state or local
government; only 29% said the same of the federal government. Id. For a review of the
historical swings in comparative trust, see Hetherington & Nugent, supra note 99, and
Pettys, supra note 2.
1 Hamilton explains:
It is a known fact in human nature that its affections are commonly weak in
proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle
that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighbourhood, to his
neighbourhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be
apt to feel a stronger byass towards their local governments than towards the
government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a
much better administration of the latter.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 107.
Madison elaborates upon this point in The FederalistNo. 46:
Many considerations.., place it beyond doubt, that the first and most natural
attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective
States.... With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely
conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people
have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments; on the side of these therefore the popular bias, may well be expected
most strongly to incline.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 316.
112 Hamilton points to the states' specific responsibilities over crime and
punishment as one way in which states can "cement" their hold over citizens' loyalties:
[T]he ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice ...is the most powerful,
most universal and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is
that which-being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property-having
its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye-regulating all
those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals
is more immediately awake-contributes more than any other circumstance to
impressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem and reverence towards
the government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 107; id.at 108 ("The
operations of the national government.., falling less immediately under the observation
of the mass of the citizens the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and
attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to
come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire a
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should the states squander the people's trust, they can always win it back, as
they did in the 1970s, and reclaim domains once lost to the federal
government. 113
In any event, comparative trust protects states precisely when one would
most want to protect them-namely, when state governments are operating
more competently, openly, and honestly, than the federal government. Trust
ceases to provide protection for state prerogatives only when state
governments lose the confidence of the-people-but these are the occasions
when states, arguably, deserve less protection. The Framers themselves may
have believed that trust in state governments (or something like trust) would
be sufficient to keep Congress at bay and preserve state power. 114 But as
James Madison suggested, should the states squander that trust, "the people
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where
they may discover it to be most due."' "15 Today, it may be the states, and
twenty years from now, it may be the federal government; the point is, the
people should not be required to suffer incompetence, corruption, and maladministration when they have another agent (be it state or federal) they
believe will do abetter job executing their will. 116
habitual sense of obligation and an active sentiment of attachment.").
113 Indeed, the Framers may have expected the federal and state governments to
engage in an ongoing "competition for the political allegiance and affections" of the
people, suggesting that loyalties and power would shift back and forth over time. Jack N.
Rackove, The Origins of JudicialReview: A Pleafor New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REv.
1031, 1042 (1997). Pettys suggests that the competition between the state and federal
governments is alive and well today and will not collapse so long as three conditions are
met: first,' each sovereign must possess a proving ground-a domain in which it is
assured of an opportunity to earn affection; second, each sovereign must remain
autonomous--one government cannot control what the other does; and third, the system
must remain transparent-the people must know where to assign blame. Pettys, supra
note 2, at 357-60.
114 THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 106 (insisting
the national government could not usurp state powers, due to the "greater degree of
influence which the State governments, if they administer their affairs with uprightness
and prudence, will generally possess over the people"); THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James
Madison), supra note 37, at 322 ("[The central government] will not possess the
confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the
State Governments; who will be supported by the people.").
115 THE FEDERALISTNO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 317.
116 One possible critique of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which invalidated a portion of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), is that it ignored public evaluations of comparative
trustworthiness. The majority emphasized that the states had traditionally handled
domestic violence (and related) issues, and said it could find no basis upon which to
justify the federal government's intervention. Id. at 615-18, 627. But what it failed to
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3. ComparativeControl
At any rate, whether or not they trust state governments more, citizens
have a second reason for delegating any quantum of policymaking discretion
to state, rather than federal officials: they can keep state executive officials
on a shorter leash. If a state official abuses the power he or she has been
given-say, by overstepping statutory authority or by exercising poor
judgment-the people may be able to remove him or her. The same cannot
be said of federal officials.
In almost all states, voters elect several of the topmost executive
officials, including the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, and
treasurer, among others. Forty-six states allow voters to elect at least one
senior executive official besides the governor, and on average, voters elect
almost five such officials. 117 Countless local officials, such as district
attorneys and county assessors, are also chosen directly by the people. And in
18
thirty-eight states, even the members of the judicial branch are elected.1
Moreover, in eighteen states and in more than two-thirds of all local
governments, voters are allowed to recall public officials who have
squandered the public trust.1 19 In short, if a state official were to enforce (or
interpret) a law in a way that displeased most citizens, the citizens would

consider was that passage of VAWA may have been spurred by long-standing public
dissatisfaction with the way state officials had traditionally handled domestic violence
(and related) laws. Namely, the people (and women in particular) may have lost trust in
the ability of state police, state prosecutors, and state trial judges to handle domestic
violence effectively and fairly. After all, Congress had found that state police made
arrests in fewer than 1 out of 100 domestic assault cases; state prosecutors obtained
convictions against fewer than 4 out of 100 rapists, on average; and state courts imposed
stiff prison terms (i.e., more than twelve months) on less than one-half of convicted
rapists. Id. at 632-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing congressional hearings and
legislative history). Arguably, this might be the situation Madison had in mind when he
suggested "the people ought not.. . be precluded from giving most of their confidence
where they may discover it to be most due"-in this case, the federal, government. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 317.
117 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 350 (Keon S.
Chi ed., 2005). Senior officials include Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of Agriculture,
Comptroller, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Attorney General, Auditor, and
Superintendent of Public Instruction. Id.
118 Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule
ofLaw, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 725 (1995).
119 NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RECALL OF STATE OFFICIALS (2006),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/recallprovision.htm;
INT'L
CITY/COUNTY MGMT. ASS'N, MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT 1996 2 (on file with
author) (69% of municipalities surveyed allow recall elections).
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have the power to remove the official directly at the ballot box-either at the
next election or via the recall device.
At the federal level, by contrast, only the President is elected by the
people, and then, only indirectly via the Electoral College. This means
citizens have much less influence over the federal Executive than they do
over the state executive. Nor can the people expect Congress to check abuses
of executive power for them. It is very difficult for Congress to supervise or
rescind delegated authority. The federal courts usually defer to executive
interpretations of statutory authority; 12 0 and they also prohibit Congress from
"vetoing" executive action, other than by passing new legislation. 12 1 But
such legislation must be presented to the President, who may, of course, veto
it. Congress could, in theory, impeach the President (or other Executive
branch officials), but doing so, like overriding the veto itself, requires almost
22
overwhelming (two-thirds) consensus.1
To summarize, citizens are not so easily convinced to transfer powers
from their state governments to the federal government. Citizens may balk at
federalization, not because they oppose congressional aims, or quibble with
statutory language, but because they dislike the idea of federal
enforcement.1 2 3 Citizens trust state governments more, reflecting, in part, a
belief that the states do a better job administering policy, and this may
temper support for congressional legislation on issues that would otherwise
be handled by the states. In addition, citizens can check state/local officials at
the ballot box-an option that is simply not available against any federal
Executive or Judicial branch official except a first-term President-making
any delegation of authority to state officials less risky. Thus, while Congress
may sometimes promise citizens the policy outcome the majority preferssay, a ban on PAS-citizens may nonetheless oppose congressional
legislation on the belief that federal officials will not execute or interpret the
policy as competently or faithfully as would state officials.

120 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844-45 (1984).
121 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (finding legislative veto
unconstitutional because it deviates from Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses of
Article I).
122 U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 7, cl. 2 (requiring a two-thirds vote of both houses to

override a veto); id. at § 3, cl. 6 (requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate for an
impeachment conviction). Of 174 presidential vetoes issued from 1968-1998, only thirty
were successfully overridden by Congress. Richard S. Conley & Arnie Kreppel, Towards
a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, 54 POL. REs. Q. 831, 841-843 (2001).
123 In some instances, Congress may be able to sidestep this safeguard by issuing
regulations that will be enforced by state, rather than federal, officials. See discussion
infra Part VI.B.
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C. DemocraticProcesses
So far, the considerations that shape public attitudes towards
congressional legislation have all been policy-oriented, broadly defined:
citizens care about the content of legislation, its potential impact on related
issues, and how it will be enforced. But citizens also care about how policy is
made. Studies have shown that when citizens formulate opinions about
government actions, they place weight on matters of procedure, and not just
matters of policy substance. 124 Indeed, a burgeoning line of political science
research suggests that citizens care as much about the processes that
government follows as they do about the outputs of those processes. 12 5 To
the extent that governmental processes are perceived as being fair, for
example, citizens are more likely to comply with the government's decisions,
even when they disagree with those decisions on the merits. 126 Other scholars
have found that some citizens support a variety of reforms to the political
process-campaign finance laws, the use of ballot initiatives, and the
devolution of power to the states, among others-that may not be conducive
to enacting the substantive policies they favor. 12 7 That is, some citizens
support reforms of the political process, even though the current process is
more likely to generate policy outputs they favor (say, because their political

124 E.g., Dennis Chong, How People Think, Reason, and Feel About Rights and

Liberties, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 867, 874-75 (1993) (when subjects were asked whether
government should allow controversial groups like the KKK to demonstrate, they
considered procedural rules, among other things-and not just their feelings towards the
group at issue-before making their decision).
125 HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 99, at 6 ("Contrary to popular belief,
many people have vague policy preferences and crystal-clear process preferences, so their
actions can be understood only if we investigate these process preferences."); id. at 34
("We believe people are more affected by the processes of government than by the
policies government enacts.") (emphasis added).
126 James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy,
ProceduralJustice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 469, 471 (1989)
(reviewing research on the impact of legitimacy and procedural fairness on public
attitudes and finding that "[p]roper process contributes to acceptance of unpopular
products"); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional
Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular US. Supreme CourtDecisions: A Reply to

Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 621, 622 (1991). In their study of the 1991 California
water shortage, for example, Tyler and Degoey find that citizens are more likely to
comply with policies if they believe that the procedures that created the policies are fair.
Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural
Justice and Social IdentificationEffects on Supportfor Authorities, 69 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 482,483 (1995).
127 HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 99, at 77.
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party currently controls both branches of government).' 28 In short, citizens
care about how government is run.
This concern for democratic process hinders Congress's ability to
federalize state policy domains for two reasons. First, some citizens believe
the people themselves ought' to have final say on important public policy
decisions via ballot measures and similar devices; these citizens might
oppose congressional legislation in order to spare state laws they deem more
"legitimate" (i.e., because they were approved by the voters), or to preserve
future opportunities for a direct say in government affairs. Second, citizens
may believe that federalism itself is an essential facet of the nation's
legitimate democratic process, and not just a means to another end, and may
thus oppose congressional legislation that violates their preconceived notions
of the proper allocation of responsibilities between the state and federal
governments. For both reasons, citizens may oppose congressional
legislation, even at the expense of sacrificing immediate policy objectives,
and thereby preserve state prerogatives.
1. The Appeal of Direct Democracy
One of the benefits of federalism is that it enhances citizen participation
in government.' 29 The explanation stems in part from the fact that state (and
local) governments follow procedures that give citizens a greater say over
local affairs than they have over national affairs. Twenty-four states have
procedures in place that permit some form of direct legislation by the voters,
commonly referred to as ballot initiatives. 130 In these states, the citizens may
enact legislation without the assistance (or interference) of their state
legislatures. What is more, all fifty states utilize some form of referendum,
under which voters may accept or reject legislation proposed or enacted by
the state government. 13 1 And direct democracy is employed even more
commonly by local governments, more than half of which have some form of
12 8 Id. at 82.
129 E.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 71, 81 ("It is a shibboleth of the
literature endorsing federalism that states facilitate a kind or degree of political
participation by citizens that does not occur at the national level.").
13 0 INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., WHAT IS THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

PROCESS? (2007), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%2OWhat%2Ois%
201&R.htm.
131 Under the legislative referendum, available in all fifty states, an arm of the state
submits legislation or constitutional amendments to the voters for their consideration.
Under the popular referendum, used in twenty-four states, the voters, on their own
initiative, may approve or reject legislation or amendments that were enacted by the state
legislature. Id.
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initiative and ninety percent of which utilize some form of referendum
procedure. 132 By contrast, the opportunities for citizen participation at the
federal level are quite limited; citizens may lobby and petition federal
representatives (and bureaucrats), but they lack any direct say over the
enactment of federal laws, which must be passed by both houses of Congress
133
and presented to the President.
As discussed above, direct democracy has instrumental value; the
availability of ballot measures (and similar devices) makes it easier for state
governments, broadly defined, to satisfy majoritarian policy preferences,
often by curtailing the power of minority interests to block such legislation.
This gives citizens an incentive to oppose federal encroachments, at least
when states do, in fact, generate preferable policy outputs. But the
widespread use of direct democracy may help to safeguard state prerogatives
for two other reasons as well, whether or not states adopt more appealing
policies.
First, the public may oppose congressional legislation that preempts state
authority and thereby eliminates opportunities for participating in
government at the state and local level. Direct democracy remains
enormously popular among the people. 134 Since 1904, citizens have
considered more than 2000 ballot initiatives, and 379 initiatives appeared on
ballots in the 1990s alone. 135 To some citizens, the act of participating in
politics has intrinsic value; it is more than a means by which to shape public
policy. And congressional legislation may deprive citizens of the opportunity
to participate by preempting state laws governing the same issue. 136 Simply
132 TARI RENNER,

INITIATIVE &

REFERENDUM

INST.,

LOCAL INITIATIVE AND

REFERENDUM INTHE U.S. (2007), http://iandrinstitute.org/Local%201&R.htm.
133 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
134 E.g., HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 99, at 75 (noting that 86% of their

respondents would like to see an increase in ballot initiatives); Gordon S. Black
Corporation, May, 1992, Roper Center Database, supra note 50, accession no. 0195850
(92% of respondents support ballot initiatives).
135 INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM USE 1 (2006),

http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20Initiative%20Use.pdf.
136 Rapaczynski, supra note 6, at 404 (noting that "the vitality of the participatory
state institutions depends in part on the types of substantive decisions that are left for the
states").
For examples of federal legislation preempting state or local initiatives, see Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Proposition 4,
which restricts the use of certain traps and poisons, is preempted by Endangered Species
Act and National Wildlife Refuge Systems Improvement Act), Wash. State Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-32 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an initiative banning storage of radioactive waste generated outside state of
Washington is preempted by numerous federal statutes), and League of United Latin Am.
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put, the more policy space Congress occupies, the less room citizens have to
govern directly. Hence, some citizens may oppose congressional legislation,
even when it serves their policy goals, in order to safeguard their voice in
government.
Second, citizens may also be more reluctant to trump state laws that were
enacted via the initiative process. Citizens tend to view laws enacted via the
initiative process as more legitimate than laws enacted by their
representatives, state or federal.' 37 The aura of legitimacy conferred upon
ballot initiatives could have a powerful impact on public opinion. It may give
citizens an incentive to oppose attempts to federalize issues on which the
voters have already spoken directly, whether or not they agree with what the
voters had to say, and whether or not they value the act of participation.
Oregon's long-standing battle over PAS illustrates how citizens may be
willing to defend voter initiatives, even when they disagree with the outcome
of those initiatives. In November 1994, Oregon voters approved by the
slimmest of margins (52% to 48%) the ballot initiative allowing terminally ill
patients to seek prescription drugs to hasten death. 138 Not satisfied with the
outcome, the state legislature only three years later sponsored a new ballot
measure that would repeal the PAS statute. Oregon voters, however, defeated
the repeal effort by a much wider margin (60% to 40%) than first supported
PAS. 139 Observers have suggested the repeal measure was defeated so
handily not because popular attitudes towards PAS had shifted, but because
the repeal had been sponsored by the state legislature and not by the voters
0
themselves.14

Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that Proposition 187,
which denies public benefits to illegal immigrants, is preempted by Immigration and
Nationality Act).
137 Jack Citrin, Who's the Boss? Direct Democracy and Popular Control of
Government, in BROKEN CONTRACT?: CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AMERICANS
AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 268, 268-73 (Stephen C. Craig ed., 1996); Rapaczynski, supra
note 6, at 396 (noting that citizen participation generally enhances the legitimacy of
government). Whether laws passed through the initiative process are, in fact, more
legitimate, according to normative political theory, is beside the point; rightly or wrongly,
the public views such laws as more legitimate, making them more resilient in the court of
public opinion to challenges from Congress (or elsewhere).
138 Don Colbum, Assisted Suicide Bill Passes: Oregon Law Puts State at Center of
EthicalDebate, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1994, at Z9.
139 Jane Meredith Adams, Assisted Suicide Gains in Propriety, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 9, 1997, at D3.
140 The Paper Trail, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al. Opponents also tried to
overturn the Death with Dignity Act by appealing to the state courts and to the federal
Executive, which may have further alienated some who otherwise opposed PAS. Id.
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To sum up, citizens may value the unique opportunity to participate in
governmental decision-making that only state and local governments can
provide. Whether it is because federal legislation crowds out the opportunity
to participate in lawmaking, or because citizens feel they (and not their
representatives) should have final say on important matters of public policy,
the widespread use of direct democracy in the states gives citizens an
additional reason, independent of the merits of legislation, to oppose federal
laws that usurp state authority.
2. The (Surprising)Appeal of Federalism
In addition to direct democracy, federalism itself may be valued by
citizens. In other words-and contrary to popular wisdom' 4 1 -citizens may
believe in a limited central government, and, as a consequence, they may
oppose congressional action on an issue they believe a priori ought to be
handled by the states instead, even if they have no objection to the content of
Congress's proposal. In this Section, I show that citizens do indeed have
beliefs about which level of government ought to handle various policy
domains. Just as importantly, I show that these beliefs are consequential-in
other words, some citizens appear willing to stand up for this principle even
at the expense of satisfying their short-term policy preferences.
To begin, many citizens have well-defined notions-quite separate from
any immediate policy concerns-about which level of government (local,
state, or federal) ought to control various policy domains. On some issues,
they prefer state (or local) control; and on other issues, they prefer federal
control. In public opinion polls, for example, sizeable majorities favor
state/local control of education (80%), homelessness (75%), and crime (8 1%)
policies, whereas most say that the federal government should handle
economic development (61%); citizens are more evenly divided when it
comes to responsibility for other matters, such as public health and
pollution. 14 2 The belief that the states should control some domains, and the
141 McConnell, supra note 37, at 1488 (suggesting that "for most people.., issues
of federalism take second seat to particular substantive outcomes"); McGinnis, supra
note 8, at 931-32 (opining that "because [federalism] is a structural principle, citizens are
largely indifferent to it when it conflicts with issues that stir their passions"); McGinnis &
Somin, supra note 6, at 96 ("Federalism is an abstract and complicated system compared
to many underlying public policy issues like drugs and education, which are more
concrete and more likely to engage the passions of citizens."). See also Neal Devins, The
D'oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105 MICH. L. REv.1333, 1341 (2007) ("Voters-if
they think about politics at all-think about policy preferences, not theories of
constitutional interpretation.").
142 ROEDER, supra note 99, at 99 tbl. 6-1. See also CBS/New York Times Poll,
Mar. 10-14, 2004, Roper Center Database, supra note 50, accession no. 0449531
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federal government others, is consistent with the -notion that citizens
power, in other words, that citizens recognize
recognize limitations to federal
43
1
federalism.
of
the principle
What is more, for at least some segment of the population, such opinions
regarding the proper division of state/federal authority carry weight; in other
words, they may trump policy considerations when citizens formulate their
opinions of proposed federal legislation. One sign that federalism matters to
voters comes from the fact that political elites commonly appeal to the
principle of federalisn--namely, the abstract notion of a limited central
government-to rally public opposition to congressional legislation. Elites
who defend federalism as a legitimate democratic process make two versions
of the argument. The first version appeals to the tradition of state control of a
particular domain (e.g., "the states have always defined marriage," or "the
states have always regulated medical practices"). By this argument, the
process by which laws are enacted in these issue domains has already been
established, and those who seek to aggrandize federal control are violating
that process. The second version of the process-oriented argument reflects a
concern for tyranny, defined as the concentration of power into a single
entity or level of government. It implores citizens not to impose their values
on other citizens through Congress-to live and let live (e.g., "what happens
in another state is none of your business").
Recent debates over the twice-defeated federal constitutional amendment
to ban same-sex marriage highlight elite efforts to make federalism trump
other considerations among the electorate. Opponents of the amendment
frequently cited traditional state primacy in the field of family law to defend
their position among voters who might otherwise support the amendment.
John Kerry, for example, professed personal disagreement with same-sex
marriages, but nonetheless objected to a federal constitutional amendment to
ban them on federalism grounds: "for 200 years, this has been a state issue. I
oppose this election year effort to amend the Constitution in an area that each

(reporting that a small majority-50% versus 46 0 /--of respondents favor state versus
federal control of gun laws).
Citizens also have more abstract views about the proper scope of federal power. In a
July 2003 Pew Research Center poll, respondents were asked their views on the
following statement: "The federal government should run only those things that cannot be
run at the local level." The poll found that 29% of respondents completely agreed with
the statement; 42% mostly agreed; 17% mostly disagreed, and 7% completely disagreed.
Pew Research Center Poll, Nov. 2003, Roper Center Database, supra note 50, accession
no. 0441914.
143 Here I suggest that citizens' views about the authority of state and federal
governments reflect a principled determination that-as a matter of democratic processthe states ought to control a particular policy domain.
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state can adequately address."' 144 Likewise, in debates on the floor of
Congress, members invoked tradition to oppose the amendment. Senator
Christopher Dodd's comments are illustrative:
Since the founding of our Nation, marriage has been the province of the
States, and in my view it should continue to be a State issue. Yet the Federal
Marriage Amendment would deprive States of their traditional power to
define marriage and impose a national definition of marriage on the entire
45

country. 1

Similarly, opponents of the same-sex marriage amendment have also
implored voters to take a live and let live attitude. For example, Senator Jim
Jeffords of Vermont told his constituents that Congress should leave the
power to define marriage in the hands of the states, regardless of how they
might wield it: "I believe our States are not only capable but deserving to
define marriage in the way they see fit. Every State will bring its own
approach, and I am proud the way my State led the Nation in addressing this
issue." 14 6 During the 2000 Vice-Presidential debate, Dick Cheney's view on
same-sex marriage reflected this same line of argument:
The fact of the matter is we live in a free society, and freedom means
freedom for everybody. We shouldn't be able to choose and say you get to
live free and you don't. ...The fact of the matter is that [same-sex

marriage] is regulated by the states. I think different states are likely to
come to different conclusions, and that's appropriate. I don't think there
147
should necessarily be a federal policy in this area.
Such appeals to federalism have figured prominently in other recent
congressional campaigns as well, including debates over national PAS
legislation. 14 8 Similar arguments may have also played a prominent role in
49
defeating congressional legislation much earlier in the nation's history. 1
144 Marie Horrigan, Kerry, Edwards Oppose MarriageAmendment, UPI, Feb. 24,
2004, http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/Analysis/2004/02/24/kerryedwards
_oppose marriageamendment.
145 150 CONG. REC. S8074 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
146 150 CONG. REC. S7997 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
147 COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
VICE

PRESIDENTIAL

DEBATE

(Oct.

5,

Transcript,

2000),

THE LIEBERMAN-CHENEY

http://www.debates.org/pages/

trans2000d.html.
148 Senator Wyden of Oregon invoked the tyranny argument in his effort to defeat
the Pain Relief Promotion Act in 2000:
I firmly believe that my election certificate does not give me the authority to
substitute my personal and religious beliefs for the judgment made twice by the
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To be sure, the conventional wisdom suggests that federalism arguments
are merely window dressing-that elites are not genuinely interested in
protecting federalism. In a 2004 op-ed in The New York Times, for example,
law professor William Rubenstein suggested that federalism is a red herring:
"Politicians generally like a constitutional discussion because it allows them
a way to avoid controversial topics by reframing them in terms of the two
organizing principles of our system of government: separation of powers and
150
federalism."
people of Oregon. The states have always possessed the clear authority to determine
acceptable medical practice and acceptable medical uses of controlled substances,
and I am going to fight with all my strength to preserve Oregon's rights on this
matter.
ProposedAmendment to the PainRelief Promotion Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on

the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 21-22 (2000) (statement of Sen. Wyden, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary).
Similarly, the editorial board of one of the leading newspapers in Oregon was
vehemently opposed to efforts to legalize PAS, but when Oregon voters (for the second
time) backed the practice, the editorial board called upon the federal government to
respect their decision. Editorial, Oregon's Choice Good or Bad, State's Assisted Suicide
Law Deserves Respect from FederalGovernment, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 8, 1997, at D6
("We continue to oppose the physician-assisted-suicide law as a dangerous step beyond
historically accepted medical practice. But we also accept Oregon's right to take that
step .... A federal decision to punish Oregon doctors for doing something permitted by
Oregon law would usurp that right.").
149 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-6- Vis the States:
The DispensabilityofJudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1568-70 (1977). One example
involves the successful campaign against the Second Bank of the United States in 1832.
Congress's authority to create the Bank had been upheld in the famous case of
McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Nonetheless, just
thirteen years later, opponents of the Bank succeeded in convincing President Andrew
Jackson to veto congressional legislation that would have extended the Bank's charter
another twenty years. The Bank was opposed by a diverse coalition of interests, but the
successful public campaign against it was framed mainly as a battle for states' rights.
Daniel J. Elazar, Federal-State Collaboration in the Nineteenth-Century United States,
79 POL. ScL. Q. 248, 259-60 (1964); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS INAMERICA:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 214 (1957) ("[P]ersonal and business
considerations [against the First Bank of the United States] ... were subordinated, in
public discussion, to general arguments. The favorite contention was that the Bank of the
United States was unconstitutional. This was a line of attack... that could be taken up by
anyone, no matter how little he knew of banking, money, or the government's fiscal
affairs.").
150 William B. Rubenstein, Hiding Behind the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2004, at A13. See also Hamilton, supra note 6, at 1083 (claiming that "[i]t is common
knowledge on Capitol Hill that federalism or states' rights are nonstarters as objections to
legislation. Members spout federalism rhetoric to block legislation they oppose for other
reasons, but it is never a dispositive consideration").
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But the criticism that elites only invoke federalism to avoid taking a
stance on a controversial issue simply misses the point. What matters for
present purposes is whether citizens care-or can be made to care-about
federalism, and not whether elites themselves buy into the principles they
espouse in campaigns (which they will, presumably, only if citizens value the
same principles). And for two distinct reasons, appeals to federalism in elite
debate support the notion that citizens care about the allocation of
state/federal powers. For one thing, by exposing the public to federalism
appeals on a regular basis, elite debate can make federalism a more salient
consideration in the minds of citizens. 15 1 That is, even if citizens normally do
not think spontaneously about federalism when evaluating congressional
action, elites can bring federalism considerations to mind through public
campaigns (e.g., through speeches, mailings, advertisements, debates, and so
on).
In addition, and even more importantly, the fact that elites choose to
frame debates around federalism-and sometimes stake their political careers
on it-suggests that some citizens must value federalism. Elites realize, of
course, that re-framing debates is an important way to influence public
opinion. 152 Re-framing debates in a particular way will serve their purposes,
however, only if the chosen frame resonates with the public.

151 Kam & Mikos, supra note 102, at 616-18 (finding that elite debate raised the
salience of federalism, as subjects decided whether to support congressional ban on
PAS); see also Chong, supra note 124, at 869 (noting that cues raised the salience of
constitutional guarantees, such as free speech, as subjects decided whether to allow
controversial groups to demonstrate).
152 In the political arena, "[e]lites wage a war of frames because they know that if
their frame becomes the dominant way of thinking about a particular problem, then the
battle for public opinion has been won." Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder, Issue
Frames and Group-Centrismin American Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 1055, 1058 (1996);
see also JACOBS & SHAPIRO, supra note 24, at 8 (finding that political elites are strategic
in the frames they use to persuade the public, and that if a frame does not resonate with
the public, political elites take notice, and they adjust their strategies accordingly);
DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 164 (1996) (noting that frames are "rhetorical weapons created and
sharpened by political elites to advance their interests and ideologies"); POPKIN, supra
note 25, at 9 (finding that "campaigns and media... influence the voter's frame of
reference, and can thereby change his or her vote"); Dennis Chong, Creating Common
Frames of Reference on Political Issues, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE

CHANGE 221 (Diana C. Mutz et al. eds., 2006) ("Much public opinion formation is a
strategic process in which opinion leaders are trying to persuade the public to think about
political issues along particular lines, to activate existing values, prejudices, and
ideas... and to draw obvious conclusions from those chosen frames of reference."
(citation omitted)).
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To illustrate, recall the debate over the proposed constitutional
amendment to ban same-sex marriage. Suppose that a United States.
Representative does not want to stake out a position on the merits of the
issue-she fears taking a stance would alienate a large number of
constituents, who are split on the merits of the proposal (i.e., whether or not
same-sex marriages should be recognized). The representative may attempt
to reframe the debate, but her constituents will only let her "off the hook," so
to speak, if the new frame implicates something the constituents actually
value. Suppose, for example, the representative announces that she opposes
the amendment simply because it would make the Constitution "too long"
(i.e., she says "twenty-seven amendments is enough"). She has reframed the
debate-it is no longer about same-sex marriage, but about the length of the
Constitution-but it will not appease constituents on either side of the samesex marriage debate. In fact, it may actually harm her re-election prospects,
because her constituents may punish her for such an obvious attempt to duck
an important issue (few voters are likely to care about lengthening the
Constitution). But if she chooses a frame that resonates with her voters-"I
oppose this amendment because the states should decide whether or not to
recognize same-sex marriages"--they may be appeased, regardless of what
they think of the underlying issue of same-sex marriage.
There is also empirical support for the proposition that federalism
concerns dampen support for congressional legislation that oversteps
preconceived limits the public would impose on federal power. In the study
of popular support for a federal ban on PAS discussed above, my co-author,
and I found that some citizens do indeed care about federalism-that is, an
abstract preference for some arrangement of state/federal power may trump
their policy preferences on the issue, at least when they are exposed to
campaign arguments reminding them of federalism considerations. We asked
subjects in the study which level of government should handle controversial
medical practices such as PAS (among others issues). The answer defined
what we call the subject's federalism beliefs. When some subjects were later
asked their opinion of a congressional proposal to ban PAS, these federalism
beliefs helped predict their level of support for (or opposition to) the federal
ban, albeit not at a statistically significant level. 153 But among other subjects
who had been told to read a short statement from political elites reminding
them of federalism considerations, their a priori federalism beliefs became
more consequential. In this group, subjects who believed state governments
153 Kam & Mikos, supra note 102, at 615-16 (finding that a "strong belief that the
state government should control [the policy] domain (compared to a strong belief the
federal government should control [the policy] domain) causes an eleven percentage
point increase in probability of opposing federal action," but that the results are not
statistically significant).
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should control the policy domain were more likely to oppose the
congressional ban than were subjects who believed the federal government
154
ought to control the domain, holding all else constant.
In other words, subjects' opinions of the proposed congressional ban on
PAS did not necessarily track their policy preferences; some opposed PAS
and yet withheld their support for congressional efforts to ban it out of
respect for state prerogatives and federalism (at least, once they were
reminded of this consideration). The reduction in support for the federal ban
among those who believed a priori that the states should have primary
authority over controversial medical practices was large and statistically
significant; comparing members of this group to persons who strongly
believed the federal government should have primary authority, support for.
the congressional proposal fell by nearly twenty-nine percentage points
55
(holding all else constant).1
Other studies substantiate the notion that processes, and more
specifically, the allocation of governmental powers, influence public opinion
of government action. Research suggests, for example, that many citizens
prefer divided government at the federal level (different parties controlling
the White House and Congress), even though it often results in gridlock and
may keep the federal government from adopting policies they favor. 156 In
other words, citizens appear willing to trade off immediate policy
objectives-to tolerate some gridlock-in order to check governmental
power. Just as citizens prefer to divide power between parties across
branches of the federal government, they may prefer to divide power
between state and federal governments, even though it requires them to
sacrifice immediate policy objectives.

To summarize, each of the factors considered above-the fear of mission
creep, trust in state governments, electoral controls on state officials, and
respect for both direct democracy and federalism--saps support for federal
154 Id. at 616-18.
155 Id. at 617. Interestingly, we found that federalism arguments had a polarizing
effect; they made subjects who believed in state control even more likely to oppose the
ban, but they also made subjects who believed in federal control more likely to support
the ban-thus leading to the significant disparity in opposition between the two groups.
Id. at 618.
156 E.g., MORRIs FIORINA, DIVIDED GOvERNMENT 64 (1996); Lacy, supra note 77, at
253-54 (finding that split-ticket voting may be attributable to non-separable preference
for divided government); see also James A. Thurber, Representation,Accountability, and
Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government, 24 POL. SCt. & POL. 653, 654-56
(1991) (reviewing research).
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legislation. While citizens may be tempted to impose their values on other
states, to second guess their own state government, or to shift the costs of
regulatory programs, citizens also realize that federalization comes at a heavy
price, one which many of them will be unwilling to pay. In short, citizens
may not be so eager to federalize state policy domains. Absent a strong
demand for federalization-and given the barriers to passing congressional
legislation discussed in Part IV-the collective action problem identified in
Part III simply does not materialize.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

By demonstrating that demands for federalization are often ineffectual
and that citizens actually have powerful incentives to protect state authority,
the populist safeguards theory undercuts one of the primary rationales for
judicial review of federalism-the notion that citizens, left to their own
devices, would grant Congress authority over myriad issues the states instead
ought to control. 157 After all, if the political process can be relied upon to
157 In this Article, I do not directly address the jurisprudential claim that the

Constitution actually requires the judiciary to police Congress's substantive powers,
whether or not such supervision is necessary or wise. E.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 20 (1988) ("If the Constitution forbids federal interference with state autonomy,
then the courts cannot abandon their duty to enforce that limit simply because the
political process appears to provide a tolerable substitute for judicial review."); Prakash
& Yoo, supra note 6, at 1466-68, 1489-1520; William W. Van Alstyne, The Second
Death ofFederalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1732 (1985).
Not all share this view. Some scholars claim the Constitution does not, in fact,
designate the Court as the ultimate arbiter of federal power. Larry Kramer, for one,
suggests that the Framers thought the people (through their elected representatives in
Congress) would decide for themselves, largely free of judicial meddling, what powers
the new national government would exercise. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 49; see also,
CHOPER, supra note 2, at 175 (suggesting that federalism is a non-justiciable political
question). Others insist the people-through their representatives in government-should
assume a much larger role in constitutional interpretation, irrespective of what the
Framers may have had in mind. E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 175 (1999) (promoting a constitutional amendment that would strip
the courts ofjurisdiction over constitutional questions).
Even among those who insist the Court has a constitutional duty to delimit federal
power, few would seem to accept the corollary-that the Constitution itself fixes
(precisely and immutably, barring an amendment following Article V procedures) the
metes and bounds of that power. Instead, most commentators would seem to give the
Court some leeway in demarcating federal powers. See Baker & Young, supra note 6, at
164 (arguing for judicial review of federalism, but conceding that no clear consensus
exists about "what sort of judicial review we should have in this area"); Prakash & Yoo,
supra note 6, at 1523 (acknowledging that "demonstrating that the federal courts must
bear this responsibility [of policing congressional powers] sheds little light upon the
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rein in Congress, there is no need for the judiciary to strike down
congressional legislation in the name of states' rights.
Just as importantly, there is no guarantee that judicial review does more
good than harm, since the Court may strike federal laws that ought to stand.
The Court's federalism jurisprudence has (to put it mildly) a checkered
history. Its decisions have been inconsistent across time, incoherent on
occasion, 158 and, some would say, highly political-reflecting the policy
159
preferences of the Justices, rather than the law.
Much more could be said regarding the shortcomings of the judicial
safeguards of federalism (a topic beyond the scope of this Article). Suffice to
say that given doubts about the need for judicial review and misgivings
concerning the Court's capacity to delimit congressional powers, it is at least
arguable that the Court should consider deferring more to political judgments
about the scope of federal power than it has in its recent federalism
"offensive."
I am not suggesting that the Court should abandon federalism
considerations altogether, only that it ought to play a more circumspect role
in federal/state power disputes. The populist safeguards, while effective, are
hardly foolproof. In this Part, I consider two particular circumstances in
which we may yet need some form of judicial review to shield state
prerogatives from federal encroachments. 160 Section A explains that the
populist safeguards may not block federal administrative agencies (or the
substantive lines that should limit the national government's powers").
Suffice to say that it seems reasonable to suggest the Court might fulfill its
constitutional duty (assuming one even exists) if it were to defer more to the political
process than it does today, so long as it does not abstain entirely from the business of
reviewing the constitutionality of congressional statutes (a strategy I do not endorse, as I
make clear below).
158 See, e.g., Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1447 (acknowledging that the
Court's federalism decisions "flunk [the] requirements of either good law or good
policy"); Friedman, supra note 33, at 324 (arguing that the Court's doctrines amount to
"a set of indeterminate, largely incoherent rules that by and large permit ad hoc decisions
by judges"). For commentary from members of the Court, see, for example, United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (claiming the Court's decision
"portend[s] a return to the untenable jurisprudence" of the Lochner era).
159 For a concise review of the theories of judicial decision making, see Keith E.
Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive,
51 DuKE L.J. 477, 480-86 (2001). Whittington concludes that any explanation of the
Rehnquist Court's federalism revival must take account of "both politics and law." Id. at
518.
160 This is not meant to be an exhaustive statement of the Court's role in federalism
disputes. Legal scholars have identified other ways the Court could bolster the political
safeguards of federalism. E.g., Clark, supra note 2, passim (suggesting that various
separation of powers doctrines help protect the states); Pettys, supra note 2, at 357-60.
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federal courts) from taking powers away from the states, and thus
recommends continued judicial oversight of administrative policymaking
(via clear statement rules, for example). Section B shows how Congress itself
can dilute the populist safeguards by decoupling federal law from federal law
enforcement. It suggests that the Court needs to remain vigilant when
Congress passes legislation that will be enforced by state, rather than federal,
officials. Lastly, Section C warns that while the populist safeguards protect
states' rights, they may also endanger individual rights. Hence, we may still
need courts to safeguard individual liberty.
A. JudicialReview andAgency Action
My theory explains why Congress is not prone to usurp state authority.
But Congress is not the only institution capable of expanding federal power
at the expense of the states. The federal administrative agencies and courts
may do so as well. And since agencies and courts are not directly
accountable to the people, the dynamics that block Congress from usurping
state policy domains may not check these other lawmaking bodies from
doing so, at least when they are free to act without the express imprimatur of
Congress.
Attorney General John Ashcroft's efforts to outlaw physician-assisted
suicide (PAS) illustrate how the Executive can sidestep populist controls on
Congress's ability to federalize controversial issues. In 2001, without
consulting Congress, the states, or anyone else outside the Department of
Justice, 16 1 Ashcroft issued a ruling aimed at banning PAS in the state of
Oregon, 162 to this day, the only state to legalize the practice. 163 As discussed
above in Part V.B, Ashcroft claimed that the Controlled Substances Act of
1970 (CSA) gave him authority to bar doctors from giving their patients
lethal doses of prescription medications.
Needless to say, Ashcroft's claim proved controversial. The primary
purpose of the CSA was to combat the illicit drug trade. 164 Neither the statute
itself, nor the legislative history behind it, suggests the CSA was intended to
outlaw (or otherwise regulate) PAS, and indeed, Congress made clear its
intention not to usurp the states' power to regulate medical practices. 165 What
is more, after Oregon enacted its Death with Dignity law in 1994, and before
161 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 253-54 (2006).
162 66 Fed. Reg. 56607 (Nov. 9, 2001) ("[P]rescribing, dispensing, or administering
federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances
Act.. . regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits such conduct.").
163 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-127.897 (2005).
164 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269-70.
165 Id. at 270-71 (discussing legislative history).
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Ashcroft issued his interpretation of the CSA, Congress had twice considered
and rejected legislation that would have explicitly banned PAS. 166 Had
Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA held any water, such legislative efforts
would have been superfluous.
Given that federal agencies and courts are not subject to the same
populist controls as Congress, it may be desirable for the Court to require
that any substantial expansion of federal authority vis-z-vis the states come
directly from Congress instead. 16 7 One way the Court has done this is by
requiring that federal agencies not assert authority over traditional state
domains without a clear statement from Congress that such a result was
intended by elected lawmakers. 168 Consider Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.'69 At issue in the case was

the Corps' interpretation of its authority under the Clean Water Act
(CWA)-its so-called Migratory Bird Rule, which purported to regulate the
dumping of infill on isolated bodies of water which traditionally had been the
exclusive concern of state agencies.' 70 The Court invalidated the rule, not
because the federal government necessarily lacked the power to regulate
isolated waters (an assertion the Court did not need to address), but because
Congress had not plainly stated its intent to displace state authority over such
waters.17 1 In defining the reach of the CWA, Congress simply referred to the
"navigable waters" of the United States, but it had not clearly indicated

166 Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); Lethal Drug
Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
167 Cf Clark, supra note 2, at 1379 (suggesting the federal courts can help "preserve
state governance prerogatives" in the national lawmaking process by "requiring the
participation of actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism").
168 The clear statement rules considered here are one example of the Court's socalled avoidance canon. For a thoughtful analysis of this canon of statutory construction,
see, for example, William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a ThreeBranch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 831 (2000) (critiquing the canon on separation of
powers grounds).
169 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
170 The Corps' rule, promulgation of which did not follow the notice and comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserted jurisdiction over intrastate
waters "[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross
state lines." 51 Fed. Reg. 41217.
171 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172, 173 ("Where an
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we
expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result," particularly where
"administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power.").
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(according to the Court) that this definition was as expansive as the Corps
172
claimed.
A related line of cases instructs the courts not to apply federal regulations
to state governments, nor to abrogate state sovereign immunity, without a
plain statement from Congress that such a result was intended. In Gregory v.
Ashcroft, for example, the Court held that Congress must clearly state its
intent to apply federal labor laws to certain state employees. 17 3 In the case,
state judges had invoked the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) to challenge a Missouri law requiring them to retire at age seventy.
The Court noted that the ADEA discourages such mandatory retirement
programs and that states were clearly "employers" for purposes of ADEA;
however, the majority also noted that Congress had exempted certain
policymaking and elected officials from the Act's coverage. Since Congress
had not made it clear whether judges (or similar officials) fit within this
statutory exemption, the Court dismissed the portion of the lawsuit relying on
the ADEA. Likewise, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, a case
involving application of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court ruled that Congress
must clearly state its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 174 While
the Rehabilitation Act authorizes suits against "any recipient" of federal
funding that engages in discrimination against disabled individuals, the Court
held that this language was not specific enough to allow respondent's suit
against the state of California to proceed: "A general authorization for suit in
federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to
175
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."'
One proposition underlying both lines of cases is that the expansion of
federal authority vis-6-vis the states must come from Congress itself, and not
from federal administrative agencies or federal courts. Viewed this way,
clear statement rules may be desirable, from a populist safeguards
perspective. 176 Clear statement rules block agencies and courts from usurping
172 Similarly, in Jones v. United States, the Court rebuffed the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms and ruled that the arson of owner-occupied residential property
was not covered by the federal arson statute; although the statute referred to the
destruction of "any building," the Court held that Congress had not clearly conveyed an
intention to significantly alter the federal/state balance in the prosecution of what it
considered a traditional state crime-the arson of a house still occupied by its owner. 529
U.S. 846, 858 (2000).
173 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
174 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
175 Id. at 246. See also id. at 242 ("Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.").
176 See Clark, supra note 2, at 1427 ("Unless... Congress actually considered-and
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state powers without the consent of the people, expressed via their
representatives in Congress. Recall that, other than the President, federal
Executive branch officials are not elected by the people; nor are they subject
to recall by the voters. And one of the oft-extolled virtues of the Article III
courts is their (real or imagined) immunity to the political pressures of the
day. Hence, federal officials and judges are not accountable to the people to
the same extent members of Congress are, and their actions-say, in
interpreting federal statutes--do not necessarily represent the will of the
people. 177 Whether they seek to impose their own values on the nation, or to
curry favor with special interests, they may expand federal powers at the
expense of state prerogatives and against the wishes of the people
themselves. This helps justify the Court's insistence that federal agencies
(and courts) wait for a clear statement from Congress before assuming some
authority traditionally exercised by the states.
B. JudicialReview and Decoupling
The populist safeguards may also be diluted when Congress decouples
federal law from federal law enforcement. Typically, any expansion of
congressional authority vis-ii-vis the states comes packaged (undesirably, for
many citizens) with added executive authority as well, since federal laws are
usually enforced by federal officials. In theory, however, Congress could
decouple federal law from federal law enforcement. To illustrate, suppose
Congress passed a ban on PAS, but gave state officials the power to enforce
it. By decoupling popular federal mandates from unpopular federal
proceeded to enact into law-a proposal that threatens state prerogatives, there is no
guarantee that federal lawmaking procedures served to safeguard federalism."); Young,
supra note 64, at 1609 ("To the extent that a clear statement rule... undermines efforts
to compromise on contested issues through vague language, the rule may make [the
federal] legislative gauntlet far more difficult to run.").
Clear statement rules have been criticized on other grounds, beyond the scope of this
Article. For a useful discussion of the arguments against clear statement rules, see Kelley,
supra note 168, at 846-64 (reviewing claims that clear statement rules neither advance
legislative aims, nor allow the courts to avoid making constitutional interpretations).
177 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1283 n.209 (1999) (noting that neither administrative
agencies nor federal judges are directly accountable to the electorate); Jide Nzelibe, The
Fable of the NationalistPresident and the ParochialCongress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217,

1255 (2005-2006) ("As unelected officials, bureaucrats will not usually have the same
incentive to be as responsive as Congress to the information provided by competing
interest groups."); Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and
ConstitutionalInterpretation:How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 171-72
(1990) (arguing that compared to the judgments of unelected bureaucrats, legislative
history is a better indicator of the meaning of federal statutes).
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enforcement, Congress can make its proposals more appealing to citizens
who prefer the way their states administer laws. In effect, decoupling allows
citizens to reap some of the benefits of federalization (imposing morals outof-state, for example), without bearing one of the "costs"-submitting to
8
administrators they deem more inept, unresponsive, and/or corrupt.17
. On the one hand, allowing Congress to use state officials to administer
federal programs could help protect state prerogatives, albeit in a limited
way. When Congress passes a mandate, but gives states some discretion
regarding how to enforce it, state officials can shape the law in meaningful
ways. 179 Consider a hypothetical congressional ban on PAS, enforced by the
states. In theory, each state could tailor enforcement to suit local preferences.
District attorneys in one state might prosecute apparent violations only
sparingly, given local concerns over access to palliative care, while in
another state they may pursue violators aggressively, given strong local
opposition to PAS.
On the other hand, a congressional ban on PAS does not give states the
option of legalizing PAS altogether. States retain prerogatives, but only
concerning how the ban will be enforced. Indeed, decoupling may, on
balance, harm state prerogatives, by allowing Congress to pass even more
federal mandates. Consider the impact decoupling may have on a citizen who
strongly favors a ban on PAS, but who loathes the idea of having
Washington officials enforce it. This citizen may oppose a congressional ban,
unless, that is, Congress couples it with state enforcement instead.
It may thus be necessary to limit Congress's ability to use state
governments to administer federal laws. Consider the anti-commandeering
rule set forth in Printz v. United States, which imposes one such limitation.
At issue in Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, one
provision of which ordered state law enforcement officers to conduct
178 To be sure, decoupling can also reduce the appeal of congressional legislation,
not only because some citizens prefer federal enforcement, but also because some
citizens may doubt whether state officials will vigorously enforce federal mandates their
constituents oppose. Cf Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress's Shadow, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 1411, 1456-65 (2005) (detailing efforts by local district attorneys to
subvert federal gun control sanctions that are unpopular with local constituencies).
179 Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("In the name of State's rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create

vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies."); id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example,

all- provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement
many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central 'federal'
body. They do so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more,
with the independent authority of the 'state,' member nation, or other subsidiary
government." (citations omitted)).
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background checks on all prospective gun purchasers. Invoking precedent
and a concern for state autonomy, the Court invalidated the provision,
holding that Congress may not command state officials to administer a
80
federal regulatory program.1
Viewed from the populist safeguards perspective, the anticommandeering rule may serve two useful functions. One is that it may help
citizens (albeit in a very modest way) to sort out responsibility for potentially
controversial regulatory programs. 18 1 Suppose, for example, that voters in
some states detest submitting to background checks; the concern is that, if
Congress could force state officials to conduct such checks, voters might
blame them-and not Congress-for the imposition. Through no fault of
their own, state officials would be trusted less, easing the way for Congress
to appropriate more state power. The anti-commandeering rule, by clarifying
responsibility for regulatory programs, may help citizens form better
judgments about the comparative competence, honesty, and responsiveness
(i.e., trustworthiness) of officials serving different levels of government,
82
thereby boosting the populist safeguards.1
The anti-commandeering rule may boost the populist safeguards in a
second way, even when commandeering does not blur the lines of
accountability. Commandeering decouples federal mandates from federal
enforcement. By enabling citizens to wield congressional power without
ceding state enforcement authority, commandeering lifts one of the most
salient objections to congressional proposals-concerns about how federal
180 Id. at 935. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
(holding that Congress may not direct a state's legislature to address a particular
problem).
181 E.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 ("By forcing state governments to absorb the
financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress
can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for
the solutions with higher federal taxes."); New York, 505 U.S. at 169 (noting concern that
voters might blame state representatives for regulations that are actually dictated by
Congress, thereby permitting "the federal officials who devised the regulatory program
[to] remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision"). But see Vicki C.
Jackson, Federalismand the Uses andLimits of Law: Printz andPrinciple, 111 HARV. L.
REv. 2180, 2205 (1998) (suggesting that the concern for political accountability "may be
relevant but does not of itself justify the broad rule adopted by the Court"); Neil S.
Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L.
REv. 1629, 1633 (2006) ("[lt seems likely that citizens who pay attention to public
affairs and who care to inquire will be able to discern which level of government is
responsible for a government regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may be
largely beyond judicial or political help on the accountability front.").
182 Cf Jenna Bednar, Credit Assignment and Federal Encroachment, 15 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 285, 304-06 (2007) (suggesting that credit assignment problems may
undermine the political safeguards of federalism).
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officials will execute congressional mandates. As discussed above, citizens
may be more willing to support congressional legislation that both gives
them the substantive outcome they prefer, say, background checks for all
firearms purchases, and vests enforcement authority in their administrator of
choice, say, state or local government.
A second way Congress can decouple its legislation from federal
enforcement is by offering the states monetary grants, on condition they
adopt (and enforce) federally scripted mandates.' 8 3 This use of the
conditional spending power does not violate the anti-commandeering rule,
but the Court has placed some outer limits on the conditions Congress may
attach to federal grants. Namely, the conditions must be stated
unambiguously; they must be reasonably calculated to serve the purpose for
which the funds are being expended; and the grant must not be so large so as
to compel the states to accept the conditions. 184 Applying these guidelines in
South Dakota v. Dole, the Court upheld the National Minimum Drinking Age
Amendment. Under the Amendment, any state that refused to raise its
minimum drinking age to 21 years would forfeit five percent of federal
highway funds. 185 The Court noted the condition was explicitly stated, served
the purpose of the highway funds (promoting safe travel), and the funds at
stake (only five percent of highway grants) were not so great as to deprive
the states of any meaningful choice in the matter. 186
Such restrictions on the conditional spending power seem defensible, as
conditional spending poses an especially tough challenge for the populist
safeguards. 187 To begin, the temptation to wield Congress's conditional
spending power may be quite strong. Citizens can use conditional spending
183 Congress may "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court has declined to restrict the purposes for which
Congress may spend. In United States v. Butler, the Court took the position that "the
power of Congress to authorize expenditures of public moneys for public purposes is not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." 297 U.S. 1, 66
(1936). One implication is that Congress may offer grant monies to persuade the states to
pass regulations that Congress itself may not. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.

203, 207 (1987).
184 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-11.
185 Id.

186 Id. at 208-11.
187 See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, ConditionalSpending: Federalism's
Trojan Horse, 1988 SuP. CT. REv. 85, 123-25 (suggesting that reliance on the political
process is less justified in Dole than in Garcia);Albert J. Rosenthal, ConditionalFederal
Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1140-42 (1987) (suggesting that
political safeguards might not protect states from conditional federal spending power
since states will not be willing to refuse such grants).
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to: (a) shift the cost of programs onto taxpayers in other states (if conditions
are refused), or (b) impose value judgments on other states (if conditions are
accepted).' 8 8 What is more, citizens can do this without sacrificing state
control over the administration of the law. The grants, after all, simply fund
some program; the actual administration of the program remains in the hands
of state officials. Given the temptation to impose values or shift costs, and
the appeal of decoupling congressional mandates from federal law
enforcement, it may be wise to restrain Congress's use of conditional
spending. Limiting the amount of the grants, for example, makes it easier for
states to decline objectionable conditions, and also limits (somewhat)
Congress's ability to shift regulatory costs onto taxpayers living in states that
object to federal conditions.
C. JudicialReview andIndividual Rights
If there is little need for judicial review of states' rights claims, except in
the situations described above, one might ask whether the judiciary should
curtail review of individual rights claims as well, on the theory that citizens
might pressure government to respect personal rights as well. However,
nothing about my theory suggests the political process will protect individual
rights nearly as well as it protects states' rights. Without a doubt, some
citizens consider individual liberties when formulating their opinions of
government action; for example, when deciding whether government should
allow a controversial group like the KKK to stage a public demonstration,
some people will take into account abstract speech rights, and not just their
feelings towards the group seeking the permit.' 8 9 Yet many features of state
government (majority-friendly lawmaking procedures, for example) that help
to insulate state power from congressional encroachment also expose
minority groups to the tyranny of the majority.' 90 James Madison recognized
the tension between states' rights and individual liberty. In The Federalist
No. 10, Madison warned that smaller republics, such as the states, were more

188 As discussed earlier, these are two of the primary reasons citizens may be
tempted to cheat on any federal bargain. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.

189 See Chong, supra note 124, at 869 (finding that "the notion of a constitutional
right holds a particularly strong influence on people when they are evaluating questions
about individual rights and freedoms").
190 Cf Douglas Laycock, Federalismas a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 80 (1998) (noting that the "conflict between federalism and liberty
is most pronounced when a rogue state or region is deeply opposed to a liberty to which
the nation as a whole is committed").
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prone to capture by majority factions, and hence, more likely than larger
91
republics, such as the United States, to curtail personal rights. 1
For present purposes, I do not mean to espouse any particular theory of
the rights to which all citizens are entitled. But suppose, for sake of
argument, there was broad public consensus that certain freedoms (e.g., the
right to exercise one's religion) should be guaranteed to all citizens-namely,
that society as a whole would be better off if these rights were inviolable.
Citizens in the majority may nonetheless be tempted to infringe the rights of
minorities; for example, they may seek to denigrate other faiths, to deny
employment for people of other races, or to silence opposing viewpoints.
Such tactics may carry a price-after all, one day the government could
be turned against those currently in the majority-but minority rights remain
vulnerable, particularly at the state (and local) level. One reason is that many
states employ lawmaking procedures, such as voter referenda, that empower
the majority and make it easier to pass legislation. On the one hand, this is
good for states' rights; as discussed above, it enables states to better satisfy
majority policy preferences, giving citizens (in the majority) an incentive to
protect state power. On the other hand, it may jeopardize minority rights,
namely, when satisfying majority preferences means passing laws that
discriminate against minorities. 192 In many states, minorities simply lack the
tools (such as the filibuster) or sheer numbers necessary to stop such
proposals from passing.
Similarly, trust in state governments may both shield state authority and
endanger minority rights. As discussed above, most citizens trust state
government more than they trust the federal government. In part, this means
they believe state officials are more likely to do what they ask, which (in
some places) may mean curtailing minority rights. To simplify somewhat,
members of a majority within a state may defend state power precisely
because they believe state law enforcement will do more to suppress minority
rights, for example, by levying harsher sanctions against minority
defendants, or by stopping more minority drivers on the highways.

191 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 63 (comparing

national to state government, and finding that "as each Representative will be chosen by a
greater number of citizens in the large than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult
for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts, by which elections are
too often carried").
192 For a discussion of the impact of voter initiatives on minority rights and
interests, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in
Which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 409
(1999) (finding that "initiatives may often have a serious detrimental impact on
minorities' participation in the polity").
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I am not saying the only reason people support states' rights is to
subjugate minorities. 193 In fact, it is noteworthy that on many issues states
protect more rights than does the national polity. 194 Nor do I necessarily
endorse wholesale the Court's constitutionalization of various- individual
rights, 195 which, as others have argued, limits state prerogatives. 196 My point
is simply that nothing about my theory stops citizens from curbing personal
liberties, or dissuades them from wanting to do so. Hence, while we may not
need the courts to protect states' rights, we still may need them to safeguard
97
individual liberty. 1

Under most circumstances, the populist safeguards shield state power
from federal encroachments, thereby tempering the need for judicial review.
193 Forty years ago, political scientist William Riker denounced federalism in the
debate over civil rights, charging that "federalism is simply a hypocritical plea.. . to
permit one minority, segregationist Southern whites, to tyrannize over another minority,
the Southern Negroes." WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, AND
SIGNIFICANCE 142 (1964). In later years, however, Riker came to recognize that
federalism could protect minority interests. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1987).

194 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 97-99 (1995) (acknowledging
that states sometimes go further than the federal government in protecting individual
rights); Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals FearFederalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 452
(2002) ("There have always been areas of social policy in which certain states have been
more 'progressive,' more 'liberal' than the federal government, and those areas are
particularly marked today."); William J. Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protections
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 499-502 (1977) (noting how many states
have afforded citizens greater protections than required under federal law).
195 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking state ban on
homosexual sex); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking Texas ban on most
abortions); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (ruling that statements obtained by
state police, without apprising suspect of rights, were inadmissible at trial); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking state ban on use and distribution of
contraceptives); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking various state laws
segregating public elementary schools); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(striking Oregon law that effectively barred private schooling).
196 See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Gay Rights and American Constitutionalism:
What's a Constitution For?, 56 DUKE L.J. 545, 545 (2006) (arguing that by
constitutionalizing rights "we are eroding not only our sovereign rights to selfgovernance, but our ability as a society to debate our deepest differences with even a
modest measure of mutual respect").
197 Jesse Choper, for example, suggests the Court deem federalism a non-justiciable
political question, but continue to safeguard individual liberty.
201.

CHOPER,

supra note 2, at
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They do not, however, protect the states from federal administrative agencies
or the federal courts, both of which are insulated from populist controls;
hence, legal doctrines, such as the clear statement rule, may be needed to
ensure that significant expansions of federal authority come at the behest of
Congress, and not unaccountable agencies or courts. The safeguards may
also be diluted by Congress, which may try to delegate enforcement of
federal statutes to state officials. The anti-commandeering doctrine and
limitations on the conditional spending power thus make sense, from a
populist safeguards perspective, because they limit Congress's ability to
decouple popular federal laws from unpopular federal law enforcement.
Lastly, though we should be wary of judicial efforts to rein in Congress vis6-vis the states, nothing about my theory suggests we should abandon
judicial review of individual rights claims as well. Indeed, if anything, the
populist safeguards theory demonstrates that judicial review of individual
rights is essential, given the majoritarian-friendly nature of state lawmaking
processes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because scholars have assumed that citizens would opt to aggrandize
federal power and that Congress would accede to their demands, they have
argued that we must rely upon institutions-namely, the courts or certain
political institutions-to cabin congressional power and to preserve our
federal system. This Article has developed a new theory of the populist
safeguards of federalism suggesting the people, if given the opportunity,
would not render states powerless. The theory suggests that populist demands
for federalization may be frustrated in Congress by the diversity of citizen
policy preferences and by the anti-majoritarian structure of the federal
lawmaking process. On many issues, a majority of citizens will prefer state
policy on the merits, suggesting that proponents of national legislation will
be unable to garner enough votes in Congress to trump state authority. What
is more, citizens may defend state prerogatives, even when Congress can
satisfy majority policy preferences, because they fear congressional mission
creep, because they prefer state versus federal enforcement of laws, and
because they value government processes, and not just the outputs of those
processes. In other words, citizens are not as eager to federalize state policy
domains as the conventional wisdom suggests.
The populist safeguards theory may undermine one of the primary
justifications given for judicial efforts to delimit congressional powers-that,
barring judicial oversight, Congress would assume control of many issues the
states instead ought to handle. Nonetheless, I propose that the courts should
continue to check federal power in at least two situations: first, when
agencies federalize issues without Congress's imprimatur; and second, when
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Congress decouples federal law from federal law enforcement. I also show
why courts must remain vigilant guarding minority rights, since in-state
minorities are vulnerable to majority-friendly state lawmaking processes.
Beyond these situations, however, the populist safeguards may be effective
enough, such that (on purely pragmatic grounds) the Court should respect
power allocation judgments made by the national political process, regardless
of whether they comport with the judiciary's own notions of federalism.

